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As this thing metastasizes, cops are it. We are going to win this at
the local level.1

INTRODUCTION
Over the last dozen years, the great cities of the West—New York,
London, Madrid, Amsterdam, Boston, Toronto, Sydney, and Los
Angeles, among others—have been under the almost constant threat
of al-Qaeda type2 terrorism.3 There have been many plots against
American cities.4 Some have been planned and directed from al-

1. William Finnegan, The Terrorism Beat: How is the N.Y.P.D. Defending the
City?, NEW YORKER (July 25, 2005), http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/07/
25/050725fa_fact2.
2. Almost twelve years after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the very definition
of what Al-Qaeda as an organization is and what type of threat it represents have
evolved to a point where clarification and definition are required before even
beginning the discussion. For the benefit of this Article, a broad definition of “alQaeda,” referring to a loose global alliance of like-minded Sunni jihadist terrorist
organizations that may share affinity, an alliance, operational coordination and/or
personnel/weapons, and are intent on attacking Western interests both locally and
abroad under the banner “al-Qaeda,” will serve as the definition of the group, rather
than the more narrowly defined “al-Qaeda Core,” whose presence was generally
limited to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen.
3. See generally MITCHELL D. SILBER, THE AL QAEDA FACTOR: PLOTS AGAINST
THE WEST (2012).
4. James Jay Carafano et. al., Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: The
Homegrown Threat and the Long War on Terrorism, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 25,
2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/04/fifty-terror-plots-foiled-since9-11-the-homegrown-threat-and-the-long-war-on-terrorism; see also Sebastian
Rotella, U.S. Sees Homegrown Muslim Extremism as Rising Threat, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/07/nation/la-na-us-radicalization7-

2013] COMBATING HOMEGROWN EXTREMISM

129

Qaeda or its affiliates abroad, whereas others have been hatched by
small cells of so-called homegrown terrorists and/or lone wolves
inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology.5 And, while the vast majority of
these plots have been thwarted, some have succeeded with deadly
impact.6 As the recent al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist attack in Boston of
April 2013 demonstrated, despite the death of Osama bin Laden, the
al-Qaeda type threat to the U.S. homeland—and cities in particular—
remains both real and deadly.7
Given that terrorist threats to urban environments are unlikely to
abate any time soon, and that cities must seek to protect their citizens
from terrorism, local police departments have to consider how best to
counter this menace. At the same time, local police departments
must balance the competing challenges that urban counterterrorism
initiatives raise from security, law enforcement, intelligence and civil
liberties perspectives. More broadly, local law enforcement has to
understand the nature of the threat, which necessarily informs how it
should be best thwarted.
This Article argues that the threat is three-fold: from al-Qaeda
“Core”; al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates and allies; and homegrown
extremists. Moreover, as U.S. military and intelligence operations
overseas continue to put pressure on the first two elements, the threat
is likely to metastasize and become further decentralized.8 While the
threat from al-Qaeda Core and its overseas affiliates and allies will
remain, we have seen over the last five to seven years that these socalled “homegrown extremists”—who are radicalized here in the
United States, often in urban centers and often over the Internet—
present one of the most serious terrorism threats to the homeland.9
2009dec07 (noting, among others, disrupted plots that targeted New York City,
Dallas, Detroit, and Raleigh, N.C.).
5. Carafano et. al., supra note 4.
6. Id.
7. John Eligon & Michael Cooper, Blasts at Boston Marathon Kill 3 and Injure
100, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/us/explosionsreported-at-site-of-boston-marathon.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. The injury toll was
subsequently increased to at least 264. See, e.g., Boston Marathon Terror Attack Fast
Facts, CNN U.S. (July 11, 2013, 12:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/us/bostonmarathon-terror-attack-fast-facts (noting that the April 15, 2013 bombings killed
three people and injured at least 264).
8. See SILBER, supra note 3, at 295; see also PHILIP MUDD, TAKE DOWN: INSIDE
THE HUNT FOR AL QAEDA 79 (2009) (noting “the evolution of the threat, from a
central organization to dispersed cells or individuals espousing an al-Qaeda-ist
ideology”).
9. This Article does not take a position on the ongoing debate in the
counterterrorism community about which of these three elements currently presents
the primary threat to the United States. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino & Eric Schmitt, A
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This Article will focus on the third leg of the stool: the threat of
homegrown extremists. In particular, it addresses some of the
problems this phenomenon presents, as well as the tools available to
law enforcement and intelligence agencies to combat it in urban
environments. Finally, it will focus in particular on the role of local
law enforcement in combating this threat.
Part I of this Article begins by describing and defining the nature
of the al-Qaeda threat in general, and that of homegrown extremism
in particular. Part II then addresses the question of radicalization—
the process by which homegrown extremists may be moved to
violence. Given the often solitary nature of small cells of homegrown
extremists and/or lone wolves, Part III then turns to the questions of
how law enforcement and intelligence agencies can detect and disrupt
groups of individuals who may be radicalizing.
The Article
emphasizes in particular the role of local law enforcement agencies
and the comparative advantages such agencies may have in detecting
and combating homegrown radicalization. The Article then turns to
the New York City Police Department (NYPD) as a case study,
reviewing the legal regime that governs the steps the NYPD can take
to investigate, monitor, and/or disrupt potentially aspiring terrorists
after their detection but prior to their mobilizing to action. Part IV of
the Article then addresses some of the post-investigative tools
available to the government at both the state and federal level to
prosecute homegrown extremists before they have a chance to
conduct a violent attack.
I. THE AL-QAEDA THREAT TO THE HOMELAND 2013
In discussing the nature of the al-Qaeda threat to the homeland, as
well as how to counter it, there is a useful framework to disaggregate
the component pieces into three categories with corollary geographic
loci: (1) al-Qaeda Core (Afghanistan/Pakistan); (2) al-Qaeda
Affiliates and Allies, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

Not

Very Private Feud Over Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/weekinreview/08sciolino.html?pagewanted=all
(describing the debate between Bruce Hoffman, who believes the primary threat
comes from al-Qaeda, and Marc Sageman, who argues it comes from unaffiliated,
radicalized individuals). See generally Bruce Hoffman & Marc Sageman, Does
Osama Still Call the Shots? Debating the Containment of Al Qaeda’s Leadership,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64460/
marc-sageman-and-bruce-hoffman/does-osama-still-call-the-shots.
Rather, we
maintain that the threat will continue to come from all three elements, and thus law
enforcement and intelligence agencies must be prepared to counter the threat from
all three, accordingly.
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(Yemen), al Shabaab (Somalia), al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb
(Mali/Mauritania) and Boko Haram (Nigeria); and (3) the
homegrown threat that emanates from within the United States.
Each of these components will be discussed in turn.
A. Al-Qaeda Core
Al-Qaeda Core served as the central node of the group. Its
leadership hierarchy included Osama bin Laden and Ayman al
Zawahiri, among others, and it had been based in Afghanistan
leading up to the September 11, 2001 attacks.10 In a May 2013 speech
about terrorism, President Obama noted, “Today, the core of alQaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat. Their
remaining operatives spend more time thinking about their own
safety than plotting against us.”11 Debate continues among terrorism
experts regarding how much al-Qaeda Core has been degraded in the
more than twelve years since 9/11 by bombing campaigns, drone
strikes, Special Forces operations and other capture and arrest
operations in coordination with Pakistani and Afghan authorities.12
Yet, few dispute that al-Qaeda Core is substantially weaker than it
has been in more than a decade, having lost senior leaders and its safe
haven.13 Consequently, a weaker al-Qaeda Core is less likely to be

10. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 55 (2004).
11. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks at the National
Defense University (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
12. See Country Reports on Terrorism 2012: Chapter 1: Strategic Assessment,
U.S. DEP’T STATE (May 30, 2013), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209978.htm.
The al-Qa’ida (AQ) core, under the direction of Ayman al-Zawahiri, has
been significantly degraded as a result of ongoing worldwide efforts against
the organization. Usama bin Laden’s death was the most important
milestone in the fight against AQ, but there have been other successes—
dozens of senior AQ leaders have been removed from the fight in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Ilyas Kashmiri, one of the most capable AQ
operatives in South Asia, and Atiya Abdul Rahman, AQ’s second-incommand, were killed in Pakistan in 2011. AQ leaders Abu Yahya Al-Libi
and Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti were killed in 2012. As a result of these
leadership losses, the AQ core’s ability to direct the activities and attacks of
its affiliates has diminished, as its leaders focus increasingly on survival.

Id.
13. Id. But see Mary Habeck, Evaluating the War with Al Qaeda, Part IV: How
Are We Doing? FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 17, 2012, 1:09 PM),
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/04/17/evaluating_the_war_with_al_qaeda
_part_iv_how_well_are_we_doing (taking a slightly contrarian view, but defining alQaeda core much more broadly to essentially include the affiliates as “core”).

Well
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able to conduct complex operations directed against Western and
American cities.
Thus, the likelihood that al-Qaeda Core might be able to direct
trained operatives from its “core” in Afghanistan and Pakistan to
attack an American city, as was done in the 2009 Najibullah Zazi plot
against the New York City subway system,14 has been significantly
reduced for now.15 As President Obama noted in May 2013, “They’ve
not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11.”16
Nevertheless, should the security situation deteriorate in Afghanistan
and Pakistan as the U.S. pulls back forces and reigns in its drone
program, there is a possibility that al-Qaeda Core may have an
opportunity to reconstitute itself to some degree and reconstitute
some of its capabilities.17
B.

Affiliates and Allies

During the same time period, the al-Qaeda movement has
metastasized to ungoverned regions of the world that are difficult to
reach and may have their own organic violent extremist groups with
local agendas who are willing to formally ally or informally align
themselves with al-Qaeda Core.18 This diffuse and decentralized
element of al-Qaeda affiliates and allies has varying types of
relationships with the core organization as well as each other. These
relationships range from sharing operatives, to training, to just a loose

We will, however, draw quite a different conclusion if we look at how al
Qaeda is faring in the rest of the world. On September 11, al Qaeda
controlled perhaps a half-dozen camps in one safe-haven (Afghanistan) and
had a few tentative alliances with other jihadist groups that had mostly local
concerns. Today al Qaeda has multiple safe-havens (in northern Pakistan,
Somalia, Yemen, the Sahel); controls branches in many countries that share
al Qaeda’s global aspirations; holds territory through shadow governments
that force local Muslims to follow al Qaeda’s version of sharia; and is waging
open war on numerous battlefields (Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Mali,
etc.). Most tellingly, it is involved—sometimes weakly, at other times in
strength—in every Muslim-majority country in the world.

Id.
14. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Najibullah Zazi Indicted for Conspiracy
(Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-ag-1017.html.
15. See Obama, supra note 11.
16. Id.
17. Matthew Rosenberg & Julian E. Barnes, Al Qaeda Makes Afghan Comeback,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704355304
576215762431072584.html.
18. Mitchell D. Silber, The Ever-Evolving Al-Qaeda Threat, FOREIGN POL’Y
MAG. (May 16, 2013), http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/16/the_evolution_
of_a_threat.

2013] COMBATING HOMEGROWN EXTREMISM

133

affiliation via nomenclature. These include groups such as al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, al Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda
of the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and
jihadist groups in Pakistan like Lashkar-e-Taiba or Tehrik-eTaliban.19
President Obama both identified this element of the threat and
acknowledged their collective desire to attack the continental United
States20:
Instead, what we’ve seen is the emergence of various al-Qaeda
affiliates. From Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the
threat today is more diffuse, with Al-Qaeda’s affiliates in the
Arabian Peninsula—AQAP—the most active in plotting against our
homeland. And while none of AQAP’s efforts approach the scale of
9/11, they have continued to plot acts of terror, like the attempt to
blow up an airplane on Christmas Day in 2009.21

Many counterterrorism analysts share the President’s view of the
general threat from al-Qaeda affiliates, and agree that the Yemeni
branch poses the greatest threat to the United States of all the
groups.22
While some of these groups’ grievances are local, directing much of
their efforts to the zones of conflict in which they are based, as these
groups gain confidence and stature and seek to take a more
significant role on the world stage, they may seek to attack the United
States in its cities.23 Indeed, this has already happened twice from two
separate affiliates—first, the AQAP-directed plot to blow up an
airliner headed for Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, and then the May
2010 New York City “Times Square Bomber,” whose mission was
directed by Tehrik-e-Taliban.24

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
See Obama, supra note 11.
Id.
Cory Bennett, How Al-Qaida in Yemen Became the Biggest Terrorist Threat
to the U.S., NAT’L J. (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politicallandscape-podcast/how-al-qaida-in-yemen-became-the-biggest-terrorist-threat-tothe-u-s-20121214.
23. Brian Michael Jenkins, What Would Al Qaeda’s PowerPoints Say?, RAND
BLOG (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/08/what-would-al-qaedaspowerpoints-say.html.
24. See, e.g., Katherine Zimmerman, Al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates in 2013, AM.
ENTERPRISE INST. CRITICAL THREATS (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.slideshare.net/
CriticalThreats/al-qaeda-and-its-affiliates-in-2013 (identifying the December 2009
attempted attack as the first of three times that AQAP “has attempted to strike the
U.S. homeland”); Pakistani Taliban Behind Times Square Bomb Plot, Officials Say,
FOX NEWS (May 9, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/05/09/pakistani-
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It may be difficult to predict or detect when others of these
affiliates or allies decide to change their strategy from “the local to
the global.” Based on recent history, however, which saw Western
cities like Copenhagen and Sydney as well as New York and Detroit
targeted by these groups, the threat that one of these groups might
send operatives to American cities to carry out attacks in their
group’s name should be considered quite real.25
C.

Al-Qaeda Inspired (or Homegrown)

The United States saw few, if any, homegrown, al-Qaeda-inspired
plots in the immediate years after September 2001. However, the plot
against Fort Dix, which was thwarted in April of 2007, heralded a
wave of plots, arrests and even some successful attacks among alQaeda-inspired extremists in the United States, who had little if any
operational links to al-Qaeda.26 As noted in the May 2008 Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Report,

Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown
Terrorist Threat, “These incidents and others form part of a growing
trend that has raised concerns within the U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement communities.”27 The report quoted from then-Director
of National Intelligence Mike McConnell’s testimony before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 5, 2008, stating
that:
Over the next year, attacks by “homegrown” extremists inspired by
militant Islamic ideology but without operational direction from alQa’ida will remain a threat to the United States or against U.S.
interests overseas. The spread of radical Salafi Internet sites that
provide religious justification for attacks, increasingly aggressive and
violent anti- Western rhetoric and actions by local groups, and the
growing number of radical, self- generating cells in Western
countries that identify with violent Salafi objectives, all suggest

taliban-times-square-bomb-plot-holder-says/
(quoting
then
White
House
Counterterrorism Advisor John Brennan, who stated, “It looks as though [Shahzad]
was operating on behalf of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.”).
25. See STEPHEN TANKEL, LASHKAR-E-TAIBA: FROM 9/11 TO MUMBAI (2009),
available at http://www.ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/
pdf-filer/Tankel_01.pdf; Sebastian Rotella, Mumbai: The Plot Unfolds, Lashkar
Strikes and Investigators Scramble, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 14, 2010, 10:36 PM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/mumbai-attacks-david-coleman-headley-part-2.
26. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN & SUSAN COLLINS, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND
SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM, THE INTERNET,
AND THE HOMEGROWN TERRORIST THREAT 2 (2008), available at http://www.hsgac.
senate.gov/public/_files/IslamistReport.pdf.
27. Id. at 3.
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growth of a radical and violent segment among the West’s Muslim
populations . . . The al-Qaida-propagated narrative of an “us versus
them” struggle serves both as a platform and a potential catalyst for
radicalization of Muslims alienated from the mainstream U.S.
population.28

Some of these plots included the JFK Airport Plot (June 2007), the
Riverdale Synagogue Plot (May 2009), the Raleigh Jihad Group Plot
(July 2009), the Smadi Dallas Skyscraper Plot (September 2009), the
Finton, Springfield, Illinois Plot (September 2009), the Fort Hood
Attack (November 2009), the Farouq Ahmed Washington Metro Plot
(October 2010), and the Mohamed Osman Mohamud, Portland
Christmas Tree Plot (November 2010).29 While this wave crested by
the end of 2010, since then there still have been some consequential
plots and arrests, punctuated by the deadly Marathon Bombing in
Boston on April 15, 2013, which killed four and wounded more than
250.30
While these cases of al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism in the United
States have involved American citizens or legal residents who have
radicalized and then mobilized to violence in the West, some
Americans have traveled (or sought to travel) abroad to train with or
join al-Qaeda core or an affiliate.31 Others traveled abroad to a zone
of conflict to fight, but were redirected back to the United States to
carry out attacks, their terrorist masters recognizing that their U.S.
passports made them more valuable at home.32

28. Id. (quoting Director McConnell’s Feb. 5, 2008 testimony before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence).
29. See Carafano et al., supra note 4. President Obama noted this trend in his
May 2013 speech when he said,
[F]inally, we face a real threat from radicalized individuals here in the
United States. Deranged or alienated individuals—often U.S. citizens or
legal residents—can do enormous damage, particularly when inspired by
larger notions of violent jihad. And that pull towards extremism appears to
have led to the shooting at Fort Hood and the bombing of the Boston
Marathon.
Obama, supra note 11.
30. See Eligon & Cooper, supra note 7.
31. Faisal Shahzad, Mohamed Alessa, and Carlos Almonte are examples of
Americans who traveled or sought to travel overseas and join terrorist groups, such
as Tehrik-e-Taiban and Al Shabaab. See generally Complaint, United States v.
Alessa & Almonte, No. 10-8109 (MCA) (D.N.J. June 4, 2010), available at
http://media.nj.com/ledgerupdates_impact/other/unsealedcomplaint.pdf; Complaint,
United States v. Shahzad, No. 10-MAG-928 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2010), available at
http://s3.amazonaws.com/nytdocs/docs/333/333.pdf.
32. Najibullah Zazi, Adis Medunjanin, and Zarein Ahmedzay traveled overseas
to fight American forces in Afghanistan but were redirected back to the Untied
States by al-Qaeda. See SILBER, supra note 3, at 162.
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Potential terrorists who travel abroad present opportunities for the
federal government to detect them as they exit and reenter the
United States, or when they are communicating with overseas
terrorists. Homegrown terrorists who do not travel abroad do not
present similar opportunities. Therefore, they present a unique
challenge for federal and local U.S. law enforcement to detect,
investigate and ultimately disrupt from their operational planning.
This Article focuses on the challenges presented by the latter group,
and specifically on the role of local law enforcement in countering
those challenges.
II. RADICALIZATION AND DETECTION
A. The Radicalization Process
In the post-9/11 environment, the job of law enforcement and
intelligence is to thwart and disrupt plots before they come to
fruition.33 It is no longer good enough to investigate the act after the
fact.34 Operatives sent by overseas groups to the United States
provide certain signatures that law enforcement and intelligence may
have a chance to detect as they enter the country—such as suspicious
travel patterns or communications with an overseas group or via
intelligence gathered abroad.35 Federal intelligence agencies ranging
from the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency,
Customs and Borders Protection, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation are arrayed to detect these types of threats and have
been successful in certain cases. However, if the operatives are in the
United States and have either not traveled or were able to return
undetected, it may prove more difficult for law enforcement and
intelligence to detect them before they strike.

33. See, e.g., David Gomez, How Robert Mueller Transformed the FBI into a
Counterterrorism Agency, VALLEY NEWS (June 9, 2013), http://www.vnews.com/
opinion/6780499-95/column-how-robert-mueller-transformed-the-fbi-into-acounterterrorism-agency (“At the direction of [President George W.] Bush, FBI
Director Mueller ordered this focus on prevention—at the expense, if need be, of
prosecution.”).
34. Id.
35. Dan Amira, Did Controversial NSA Spy Programs Really Help Prevent an
Attack on the Subway?, N.Y. MAG. (June 10, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://nymag.com/
daily/intelligencer/2013/06/nsa-prism-zazi-subway-feinstein-rogers-phone.html
(discussing how NSA monitoring of a particular email address linked to al-Qaeda
gave the U.S. government the insight to begin surveillance of Najibullah Zazi after he
attempted to contact al-Qaeda from Colorado, triggering FBI surveillance of the
subject and leading ultimately to his arrest).

2013] COMBATING HOMEGROWN EXTREMISM

137

This challenge begs two others with which the intelligence
community has struggled since the 2004 attack in Madrid, which was
conducted by long-time Spanish residents.36 The first is determining
whether there is some type of pattern that maps out how a nonviolent
individual turns to violence; and the second, related challenge is
determining whether individuals in the midst of turning to violence
provide signatures or indicators that this process is unfolding.
Consequently, governmental entities, law enforcement agencies, and
intelligence agencies in the United States, the United Kingdom,
Canada, and other Western democracies have attempted to identify
behavioral patterns that are common to those who ultimately have
turned to violence in past cases and use the detection of individuals
who exhibit those behavioral patterns as indicators of persons who
may be in the process of becoming terrorists, thus providing a means
to detect them in advance of an attack.37
The New York City Police Department sought to investigate these
questions, and in 2007 published a landmark study, Radicalization in
the West: The Homegrown Threat.38 As Senior Advisor to the Rand
Corporation, Brian Jenkins noted, “Although there have been
informative analyses of the paths to violent jihad in individual
countries, this is the most comprehensive review across national
boundaries, including the terrorist conspiracies uncovered in the
United States.”39 The study analyzed the trajectories of radicalization
to violence in eleven plots, spanning Europe, North America, and
Australia.40 One of its most important findings was the identification
of a human behavior model for radicalization to violence where,
“[t]he four stages of the radicalization process, each with its distinct
set of indicators and signatures, are clearly evident in each of the
nearly one dozen terrorist-related case studies reviewed in this
Moreover, “[i]n spite of the differences in both
report.”41
circumstances and environment in each of the cases, there is a
remarkable consistency in the behaviors and trajectory of each of the

36. See SILBER, supra note 3, at 205.
37. For example, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs held a series of hearings on “The Threat of Islamic Radicalism
to the Homeland” from at least 2006 through February 2011.
38. See generally MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP’T,
RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT (2007), available at
http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_ReportRadicalization_in_the_West.pdf.
39. Id. at 11.
40. See generally id.
41. Id. at 7.
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plots across all the stages.”42 And, “[t]his consistency provides a tool
for predictability.”43 Similar to the NYPD, the FBI delineated four
stages in a radicalization process, which are reflected in the chart
reproduced in a FBI bulletin.44
While this report was the first of its kind to be released in the
public domain, a variety of think tanks, academics, and national
security and intelligence agencies began their own studies of
radicalization to violence, with terrorism as the endpoint and came to
similar conclusions, albeit with slightly different models.45 For
example, the British think tank Demos published a study noting that:
Becoming a terrorist was not always a natural or linear
progression from being a radical. Those who turned to violence
often followed a path of radicalisation [sic] which was characterised
[sic] by a culture of violence, in-group peer pressure, and an internal
code of honour [sic] where violence can be a route to accruing
status. Certain signs of radicalisation [sic] to violence are visible
from this vantage point, for example: distribution of jihad videos,
clashes with existing mosque authorities, debates between ‘do-ers’
and ‘talkers’, deep engagement in literature that explains how to
determine a kafir and what is permissible once you know, and any
criminal activity undertaken in this respect. These manifestations
are potentially useful indicators for local police agencies, community

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See

FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RETHINKING
RADICALIZATION 14–18 (2011). Beyond the scope of this Article, there is also a field
of study on “counter radicalization”—the process by which at-risk individuals can be
prevented or dissuaded from radicalizing in the first place or, failing that, the process
by which radicalized individual can be brought back from the ledge. Like the
question of which element of the threat is the greatest at the moment, there is
significant debate about different counter-radicalization programs and their
effectiveness vel non. See, e.g., BRIAN FISHMAN & ANDREW LEBOVICH, NEW AM.
FUND., COUNTERING DOMESTIC RADICALIZATION: LESSONS FOR INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION AND COMMUNITY OUTREACH (2011), available at http://www.
newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Fishman_Lebovich_Domestic_
Radicalization.pdf. See generally PETER NEUMANN, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR.,
PREVENTING VIOLENT RADICALIZATION IN AMERICA (2011), available at
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf; Anthony Richards, The

Problem with ‘Radicalization’: The Remit of ‘Prevent’ and the Need to Refocus on
Terrorism in the UK, 87 INT’L AFF. 143 (2011); Arun Kundnani & Faiza Patel,
Counter-Radicalization Lessons From the United Kingdom, ROLL CALL (July 28,
2011, 10:56 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/counter_radicalization_lessons_from_
the_united_kingdom-207779-1.html.
45. JAMIE BARTLETT ET. AL., THE EDGE OF VIOLENCE: A RADICAL APPROACH TO
EXTREMISM 6–12, 17–21, 24–34 (2010), available at http://www.demos.co.uk/files/
Edge_of_Violence_-_web.pdf.
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leaders and members, and public servants involved in working to
prevent radicalisation [sic] to violence.46

Essentially, despite common factors in these different
radicalization processes, these are models of human behavior and are
therefore not perfect—individuals do not always proceed in a linear
manner from radical thoughts to violence and there are multiple
pathways to violence, which make detection of potential terrorists
that much more difficult. As terrorism researcher Dr. Marc Sageman
has noted:
The vast majority of young people who brag and pretend that they
are tough and dangerous just talk, talk, talk . . . and do nothing.
Small wonder that law-enforcement agencies complain that they are
drowned by an ocean of false alarms, which threaten to overwhelm
their resources.
The intelligence community has reached a consensus on how to
distinguish the large number of wannabes from the small number of
terrorists. Terrorists emerge in a two-step process. The first step is
to join a political-protest community, which the intelligence
community calls “radicalization.” The second is to turn to violence,
or “mobilization.”47

This observation suggests that even with caveats that the ratio of
“noise to signal” is high, there are recognizable stages, behaviors, and
processes by which an individual becomes a terrorist, thus providing a
means by which the individual or group might be identified before
they strike.48

46. Id.
47. Marc Sageman, The Stagnation of Research on Terrorism, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Apr. 30, 2013, 11:32 AM), http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversation/2013/04/30/
the-stagnation-of-research-on-terrorism.
48. Sageman has been critical of FBI “sting methods” in preventing terrorism,
noting that such stings have real-life implications. Id. Aggressive FBI field offices
identify many young men based on nonspecific indicators, set them up in sting
operations, and arrest them. Id. According to Bayesian probability models, the odds
that these young men would ever have turned to violence are low. Id. But it is
difficult to teach lawyers and juries Bayesian probability or insights from social
psychology about how authoritative undercover officers can influence impressionable
young men. Id. The result is that many young men are convicted, and the
Department of Justice points to their convictions as justification for its sting
operations and validation of its indicators. Id. However, one has to look at intent as
well as capability; if an undercover or informant could convince them to do it, so
could an actual al-Qaeda recruiter or operative. As Phil Mudd, former Deputy
Director of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, has noted, “For all the criticism that
some of the broken plots post-9/11 have been terrorist wannabes—low-level,
unsophisticated amateurs who don’t merit the time and attention they are
getting . . . they’re only amateur wannabes until they hatch a plot that results in mass
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Online Radicalization

Radicalization to violence increasingly has an “online” component
to it.49 According to former FBI Director Mueller:
[We] face the challenges presented by a third group and that is selfradicalized, homegrown extremists in the United States. While not
formally affiliated with a foreign terrorist group, they are inspired by
those groups’ messages of violence, often through the Internet, and
because they lack formal ties, they are often particularly difficult to
detect.50

The Internet can facilitate a variety of different aspects of the
process of radicalization to violence. First, al-Qaeda’s Internet
propaganda campaign, led by the group and its acolytes, facilitates the
exposure of potential followers to jihadist ideology.51 Second, the
Internet allows for socialization—it allows like-minded individuals
who are interested in or support al-Qaeda’s message to interact
through an anonymous medium.52 Next, it can be the vehicle through
murder. Then they’re the murderous plotters who were missed.” PHILIP MUDD,
TAKE DOWN: INSIDE THE HUNT FOR AL QAEDA 77 (2013).
49. LIEBERMAN & COLLINS, supra note 26, at 12 (citing Marc Sageman, Principal,
Sageman Consulting, LLC, Prepared Statement before the U.S. Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs: Radicalization of Global Islamist
Terrorists (June 27, 2007)).
50. Id. at 3–4 (citing Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on
Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment (Feb. 5, 2008)); see also Robert S. Mueller
III, Prepared Remarks Delivered at Chatham House, London, England: From 9/11 to
7/7: Global Terrorism Today and the Challenges of Tomorrow (Apr. 7, 2008),
available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=485065 (“The bottom tier is made up of
homegrown extremists. They are self-radicalizing, self-financing, and self-executing.
They meet up on the Internet instead of in foreign training camps. They have no
formal affiliation with al-Qaeda, but they are inspired by its message of violence.
Examples of this tier include last year’s plot to blow up pipelines at JFK airport in
New York and a 2005 plot to attack military recruiting centers and a synagogue in
Los Angeles.”).
51. LIEBERMAN & COLLINS, supra note 26, at 8 (“The Internet hosts a vast
electronic repository of texts and treatises by the zealots who have given shape to the
supposed theological justifications for violent Islamist ideology and the strategies for
advancing its cause. These zealots and their ideas, which have inspired attacks in the
West and elsewhere, are considered by some to be the ‘center of gravity’ of the
violent Islamist movement, more so perhaps than bin Laden or al-Zawahiri.
According to testimony received by the Committee, websites that host this material
‘allow the Internet to function as a kind of virtual extremist madrassa enlisting and
inspiring followers around the world.” (footnotes and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
52. The Internet also plays an increasingly critical role in linking radicalized
individuals with the global Islamist terrorist movement—what Dr. Marc Sageman
calls “[m]obilization through networks.” Sageman, supra note 47. According to Dr.
Sageman,
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which individuals mobilize to action.53 Finally, the Internet provides a
reservoir of technological information that may further the
operational capabilities of an individual or nascent terrorist cell, for
which the potential end point is planning and executing a terrorist
act.54
In testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee in 2007, then-NYPD Assistant
Commissioner Larry Sanchez espoused a very similar view of the role
of the Internet in radicalization:
I believe the Internet is usually the stepping-stone where people go
to look first. If you look across these phases of radicalization, there
is an identity phase where people are really looking for an answer.
When you look for an answer, people nowadays, especially in
Western societies, go to the Internet . . . Then the Internet plays
another role. When you move to another state, which is one of
looking for other like-minded people you can come out of the
virtual world and meet real people, it has chat rooms. It talks about
places. It talks about thing [sic] you could do together. It talks
about events that you can go and join and become part of it. So now
it gives you indicators for the real world where you can meet real
people rather than living in this virtual world. And then as you
progress down these stages, the Internet then becomes a research
tool for maybe things you want to do. If you want to research
information on bomb-making material, the Internet, again, becomes
a resource for that. So it really covers the breadth of a radicalization
process and becomes a useful tool in each of its phases.55

Over the past two or three years, face-to-face radicalization is being
replaced by online radicalization. It is the interactivity of the group that
changes people’s beliefs, and such interaction is found in Islamist extremist
forums on the Internet. The same support and validation that young people
used to derive from their offline peer groups are now found in these forums
which promote the image of terrorist heroes, link them to the virtual social
movement, give them guidance and instruct them in tactics. These forums,
virtual market places for extremist ideas, have become the virtual “invisible
hand” organizing terrorist activities worldwide. The true leader of this
violent social movement is the collective discourse on a half dozen
influential forums.
LIEBERMAN & COLLINS, supra note 26, at 12–13.
53. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 38, at 8–9.
54. Id.
55. LIEBERMAN & COLLINS, supra note 26, at 21 n.42 (citing Lawrence Sanchez,
Assistant Comm’r, NYPD Intelligence Div., N.Y. City Police Dep’t, Statement
Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs,
Hearing on the Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist
Extremism (Oct. 30, 2007)).
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While some individuals have been described as “self-radicalizing”
to violence simply by surfing the web, the more common
phenomenon is a hybrid between online radicalization and real world
interactions.56
The United Kingdom’s domestic security and
intelligence service has noted in a report that became available to the
Guardian newspaper in London that “it is important to recognize the
role of online communities, People do not generally become
radicalised [sic] simply through passive browsing of extremist
websites, but many such sites create opportunities for the virtual
social interaction that drives radicalisation [sic] in the virtual world.”57
This notion is supported by Dr. Marc Sageman, who noted:
The Internet plays a critical role in the radicalization of young
Muslims into terrorists. This is a new phenomenon. The pre-9/11 alQaeda terrorists were radicalized through face-to-face interaction.
After Iraq, and especially in the past three years, this interactive
process of radicalization takes place online, in the jihadi forums.
This online radicalization is certainly replacing face to face
radicalization. The key to understanding this process is to realize
that it is based on interactivity between the members, which makes
the participants in the forums change their mind. Some of the
participants get so worked up that they declare themselves ready to
be terrorists. In a way, recruitment is self-recruitment, which is why
we cannot stop it by trying to identify and arrest “recruiters.” These
self-recruited upstarts do not need any outsiders to try to join the
terrorist social movement. Since this process takes place at home,
often in the parental home, it facilitates the emergence of
homegrown radicalization, worldwide.58

Given the multifaceted role of the Internet in the radicalization
process, law enforcement and intelligence have become more focused
on seeking to monitor extremist chat rooms, websites that promote
violent jihad, and other social media.59
The goal is to detect individuals as they radicalize, form online
conspiracies, and ultimately move to real world terrorist attacks.60 A
good example is the case of Younis Tsouli, a then-twenty-three-yearold of Moroccan descent residing in the United Kingdom. Tsouli had
become a central player in the global violent Islamist online network

56. Alan Travis, The Making of an Extremist, GUARDIAN (London) (Aug. 20,
2008),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism
(internal
quotation marks omitted).
57. Id.
58. See Sageman, supra note 47.
59. From the authors’ personal experience in counterterrorism.
60. Id.

2013] COMBATING HOMEGROWN EXTREMISM

143

and had gained the trust of, and directly assisted, the head of alQaeda in Iraq in distributing videos of attacks in Iraq.61 British
authorities’ monitoring of his online activities ultimately led to the
arrest of two Georgia Tech students in Atlanta whose radicalization
progressed from their dorm rooms to online chat rooms, where they
were then able to self-enlist in the global violent Islamist movement.62
The pair subsequently linked up with the “Toronto 18” plotters and
conducted reconnaissance on targets in the Washington, D.C. area.63
Another aspiring American homegrown terrorist whose online
activities provided a window into his intentions was Jose Pimentel,
who was arrested and charged with plotting to detonate bombs in and
around New York City in November 2011.64 He used instructions on
how to build a bomb published by al-Qaeda’s Inspire Magazine.
After a two-and-a-half year investigation, Pimentel was caught while
assembling three bombs.65
Other plots and plotters have been disrupted by monitoring
websites, chat rooms, and social media sites sympathetic to al-Qaeda
by intelligence and security agencies, making site monitoring an
important tool in the detection, investigation, and disruption of
inchoate terrorist plots.66 In fact, in the wake of the April 15 Boston
bombings, some have suggested that the failure to monitor Tamerlan
Tsarnaev’s YouTube page was a potential indicator that was missed

61. Id.
62. See SILBER, supra note 3, at 255.
63. LIEBERMAN & COLLINS, supra note 26, at 13.
64. See discussion of the Pimentel and Morton cases infra Part IV; see also
Mitchell D. Silber, Al-Qaeda’s Western Volunteer Corps, INT’L J. ON CRIMINOLOGY,
Fall 2013, at 96–97, available at http://www.ipsonet.org/images/Westphalia_Press/
Criminology/8.%20Silber%20%20Al%20Qaedas%20Western%20Volunteer%20Corps%20PDF.
pdf (“Pimentel seems to have self-radicalized via the Internet. He spent much of his
time on the Internet and maintained a radical website on YouTube called
TrueIslam1. The website contains a link to the bomb-making article in Inspire
magazine. Pimentel was also a follower of the Islamist group, Revolution Muslim,
which maintained an extremist website. Pimentel corresponded with Jesse Morton,
the founder of the website, who was sentenced in June 2012 to 11.5 years in prison for
using the Internet to solicit violence against individuals including the writers of the
popular TV-satire South Park.”).
65. Id.
66. See Complaint at 6, United States v. Nafis, No. 1:12-cr-00720-CBA (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 17, 2012), available at http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/
case_docs/2052.pdf (noting that during the period between July 6, 2012 and July 8,
2012, Nafis began to communicate—via Facebook, an internet social-media
website—with the FBI’s confidential human source about waging jihad).
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by authorities.67 “What remains unanswered is why Tsarnaev’s 2012
YouTube playlist did not ring alarm bells for the FBI. One clip
shows young Muslim warriors parading with Kalashnikovs held about
their heads, to booming martial music. The clues were all there.”68
In recent years, the publication of Inspire magazine—an online
magazine devoted to promoting al-Qaeda’s encouraging view on the
benefits of violent jihad that is specifically targeted to a Western
audience69—has frequently been associated with individuals in the
West who seek to turn to jihadist inspired violence.70 The magazine,
other than legitimatizing violence, has become a forum for aspiring
jihadists and real terrorists to publish propaganda as well as to
provide practical details on how to build explosive devices.71 Though
it is probably too strong to suggest that the magazine causes
terrorism, it has frequently been a source of information for
individuals in the West who have gone on to become terrorists—most
recently the Tsarnaev brothers in Boston.72
III. LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT’S ROLE
Much of the section above has concerned the challenge of
“identify[ing] [youths] who [are] susceptible to becoming
radicalized.”73 A second key challenge that follows, from the
perspective of law enforcement and intelligence, is what can be done
to detect and/or disrupt a radicalized individual before they mobilize
to violence. This Part focuses on that second challenge, with a
particular emphasis on local law enforcement.

67. Luke Harding & Vikram Dodd, Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s YouTube Account
Shows Jihadist Radicalisation in Pictures, GUARDIAN (London) (Apr. 22, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/22/tamerlan-tsarnaev-youtube-jihadistradicalisation.
68. See id.; see also sam232690, The Emergence of Prophecy: The Black Flags
From Khorasan, YOUTUBE (July 4, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
uJknGtKV34I.
69. Ian Black, Inspire Magazine: The Self-Help Manual for al-Qaida Terrorists,
GUARDIAN (London), May 24, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/
2013/may/24/inspire-magazine-self-help-manual-al-qaida-terrorists.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Richard Serrano, Boston Bombing Indictment: Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Inspired
by Al-Qaeda, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/27/
nation/la-na-nn-boston-marathon-bombing-suspect-indictment-20130627.
73. See Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter)Terrorism, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 1715, 1719 n.14 (2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
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A. Local Law Enforcement’s Comparative Advantages
It is (perhaps too) often said that the September 11th attacks
“changed everything,”74 but to a great extent the maxim applies to the
counterterrorism and intelligence role of local police departments.75
As then-Attorney General John Ashcroft wrote in the opening
paragraphs of a memorandum to all US Attorneys just two months
after the attacks:
The September 11 attacks demonstrate that the war on terrorism
must be fought and won at home as well as abroad. To meet this
new threat and to prevent future attacks, law enforcement officials
at all levels of government—federal, state, and local—must work
together, sharing information and resources needed both to arrest
and prosecute the individuals responsible and to detect and destroy
terrorist cells before they can strike again.76

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, it has become clear that
local police departments have a role to play in the counterterrorism
fight. “Local police agencies offer tremendous resources in terms of
personnel and the familiarity needed to prevent, investigate, and
respond to terrorism.”77 Indeed, local police departments “must be
full partners in any effective strategy for preventing acts of terror:

74. See David Cole, National Security State, NATION (Dec. 17, 2001),
http://www.thenation.com/article/national-security-state.
75. See Daniel Richman, The Right Fight, BOSTON REV. (Dec. 1,
2004), https://bostonreview.net/forum/right-fight (noting the claim that the
September 11 attacks “changed everything . . . is quite apt when applied to the
relations between the federal government and state and local governments in the
area of law enforcement”); see also Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1715 (noting that “local
police have once again emerged as a significant constituency in discussions of
national security”); Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American
Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. LAW &
POL’Y 377, 377 (2009) (“Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks inside the United
States, local police agencies have taken on greater national security roles and
responsibilities.”).
76. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United States, to All
U.S. Attorneys, Cooperation with State and Local Officials in the Fight Against
Terrorism (Nov. 13, 2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/
agdirective5.pdf.
77. Waxman, supra note 75, at 378; see also JOHN J. NEU, TORRANCE POLICE
DEP’T, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
INFORMATION SHARING, AND RISK ASSESSMENT (2007), available at
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/281.pdf
(“[S]ince
the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the role and responsibility of local law
enforcement as first responders to terrorist activity have changed. Our mission
demands that we make every effort possible to detect and prevent terrorist activity
right here in our own communities.”).
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without their participation, the federal government cannot possibly
know what ‘dots’ to connect.”78
Furthermore, although the emphasis on local police departments’
role in the counterterrorism fight seems recent, in actuality local
police departments have a long history of performing the core
counterterrorism functions such as “[i]ntelligence, investigation,
deterrence, site protection, public education and emergency
response.”79 As a result, “local police were already well suited to
perform these antiterrorism activities.”80
In fact, local law enforcement actually holds certain comparative
advantages over federal agencies in the counterterrorism fight. These
advantages include the number of local law enforcement personnel
compared to federal personnel, local agencies’ general police powers
and knowledge of the communities in which they operate, ability to
walk the beat, and their familiarity with their surroundings and what
would be considered unusual or suspicious activity.81 Importantly, for
the purposes of this Article, the crucial role of local police
departments as well as these comparative advantages “is especially
true in view of the ascendency of homegrown terrorism.”82

1.

Manpower

Local law enforcement’s first comparative advantage is one of
sheer size.83 The FBI—the primary domestic agency charged with the
counterterrorism mission—has only 13,785 special agents, plus an
additional 22,000 support personnel.84 Obviously not all of those
78. See generally Richman, supra note 75.
79. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1715 (describing a pre-World War II turf battle
between the FBI and local police departments which “serves as a powerful reminder
that local officials and agencies have historically participated in urgent matters of
national security—especially in what we would today label ‘intelligence’” (citations
omitted)); Waxman, supra note 75, at 385.
80. See Waxman, supra note 75, at 385.
81. See discussion infra Part III(a)(i)-(iii).
82. Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1716; see also GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM J.
BRATTON, POLICING TERRORISM 7 (2006), available at http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/pdf/cb_43.pdf (“As the terrorist threat moves from large international
terror groups to more loosely affiliated ‘lone wolves’ or ‘homegrown’
terrorists . . . the need to involve local police is becoming even more apparent.”).
83. See Waxman, supra note 75, at 386 (“[L]ocal police . . . agencies possess the
numbers of personnel needed to sustain these functions over vast territory and for
long periods of time.”).
84. See Quick Facts: Our People and Leadership, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts (last visited Nov. 11, 2013) (including
“intelligence analysts, language specialists, scientists, information technology
specialists, and other professionals” among the 22,117 support professionals).
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agents and support personnel are assigned to counterterrorism
concerns.
By contrast, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there were
nearly 800,000 police officers or detectives across the United States in
2010.85 The NYPD alone has approximately 34,500 uniformed
officers,86 with 1000 of them assigned to counterterrorism duties.87
Also, as two prominent commentators have noted, “Based on
numbers alone, local law enforcement personnel are much more
likely than feds to cross paths with terrorists.”88 This is particularly
true in the context of homegrown terrorists who operate without the
overseas connections that would typically put them on the FBI’s
radar.89 One prominent proponent of the decentralized threat theory
has referred to this as a “bottom-up” perspective, which focuses
“precisely on how terrorists act on the ground.”90 Viewed this way,
and with respect to the homegrown threat, “[l]ocal agencies ‘see’ the
local factors of terrorism more clearly than national agencies that
view the world through the prism of global trends.”91

2.

General Police Power/Knowledge of the Community

Local law enforcement’s second comparative advantage comes
from its general role in maintaining order and public safety in

85. See Police and Detectives, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Mar. 29, 2012),
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/police-and-detectives.htm (listing 794,300
as the number of people holding jobs of that title in 2010).
86. See Frequently Asked Questions: Police Administration, NYPD,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/faq/faq_police.shtml#1 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
87. See NYPD Increasing Security at Prominent Locations Following Boston
Marathon Blasts, CBS N.Y. (Apr. 15, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/
2013/04/15/nypd-increasing-security-following-boston-marathon-blasts/)
(quoting
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, “We have 1,000 members of the NYPD
assigned to counterterrorism duties . . . .”).
88. KELLING & BRATTON, supra note 82, at 2; see also David Thacher, The Local
Role in Homeland Security, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 636 (2005) (describing the
emphasis on local law enforcement’s number advantage as “opportunistic in the
sense that it treats the massive institutional capacity of local policing as a resource
that can be mobilized for any end that policy makers desire”). But see Rascoff, supra
note 73, at 1721–22 (criticizing generic “clichés about the sheer number of sub-federal
police departments and officers across the country and their ability to serve as ‘eyes
and ears’ of the nation” without distinguishing between intelligence collection and
analysis on the one hand and criminal investigations on the other).
89. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1722 (“In view of the emergence of homegrown
terrorism and the mounting official preoccupation with counter-radicalization, local
police are well positioned—arguably better so than their federal counterparts—to
engage in genuine intelligence work.”).
90. MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD, 23–24 (2008).
91. Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1726.
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addition to investigating specific crimes.92 In this respect, local law
enforcement agencies have a broader mandate than the FBI.93 This
broader mandate, embodied by the police officer who “walks a beat,”
can then translate into greater knowledge of the community in which
the officer operates.94 In a paper, two-time and, as of January 2014,
current NYPD Commissioner Bill Bratton and his co-author have
described it thus: “Local police officers have an everyday presence in
the communities that they are sworn to protect. They ‘walk the beat,’
communicate regularly with local residents and business owners, and
are more likely to notice even subtle changes in the neighborhoods
that they patrol.”95 As a result, “local police are positioned naturally
to collect and process information about communities and activities
within them.”96 In many respects, this positioning provides support
for the trend toward community policing, which “call[s] for a wide
and deep engagement within the community. These responses to
crime, disorder, and other community problems [such as terrorism]
require fostering both proactive and reactive relationships with local
social service agencies, civic leaders, and community organizations, as
well as developing deep awareness of community environments.”97 A
concomitant benefit of the wider mandate—epitomized by the officer
who walks the beat and “knows the community”—is that it puts the
local officer in a better position to detect unusual or suspicious
behavior.98

92. See Daniel Richman, The Right Fight, Enlisted by the Feds, Can Police Find
Sleeper Cells and Protect Civil Rights, Too?, BOSTON REV. (Dec. 1, 2004),
https://bostonreview.net/forum/right-fight.
93. See Waxman, supra note 75, at 386 (referring to local police’s “wider
mandate” of “maintaining order, patrolling, and providing services” in addition to
“preventing and investigating crime”); see also NEU, supra note 77 (“Our personnel
are on the streets of our community everyday interacting, observing, and maintaining
the public safety.”).
94. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1730 (“[T]he NYPD’s officers are mainly on
patrol—generalist cops who walk a beat and develop complex understandings of, and
working relationships with, the community.”(citations omitted)).
95. KELLING & BRATTON, supra note 82, at 1–2.
96. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1734 (“[T]he local police are in significant
respects well positioned to tap into their relationships with the local community to
useful effect. These relationships are a natural fit for local departments that have
been practicing a form of community policing for over a generation.”); Waxman,
supra note 75, at 386.
97. Waxman, supra note 75, at 386 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
98. See KELLING & BRATTON, supra note 82, at 2 (“The presence of police in our
communities sensitizes them to anomalies and yields counterterrorist data valuable to
other agencies.”); see also Waxman, supra note 75, at 401 (“Local familiarity provides
a baseline for detecting suspicious activities, and local police may have networks of
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The mandate may also build greater trust with the citizens among
whom the local officer on patrol interacts. For example, over the last
several decades, the city of Dearborn, Michigan has established an
extensive community relations approach to the local Arab
community.99
One local officer explained that “as a result,
community residents ‘feel comfortable telling me about a problem
instead of some guy they never saw before that just showed up on a
radio call.’”100
Just as importantly, “Arab community
leaders . . . echoed this sentiment.”101 This level of trust “is important
because the friends and family of suspected extremists often are the
best resources for law enforcement officials.”102
Thus, one result of this “more balanced ‘portfolio’” of
responsibilities with the local community may be a built-up well of
capital, support, and trust based on positive interactions with the
police. 103 Beyond the general good that these positive interactions
provide in and of themselves, they may also place police officers in a
better position to ask for and receive information when necessary.104
Former director of the Central Intelligence Agency James Woolsey
put it this way:
Only an effective local police establishment that has the confidence
of citizens is going to be likely to hear from, say, a local merchant in
a part of town containing a number of new immigrants that a group
of young men from abroad have recently moved into a nearby
apartment and are acting suspiciously.105

cooperative relationships with community members who supply them with
information.”(citations omitted)).
99. See Thacher, supra note 88, at 648–53.
100. Id. at 649.
101. Id.
102. RICKE “OZZIE” NELSON & BEN BODURIAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L
STUDIES, A GROWING TERRORIST THREAT? ASSESSING ‘HOMEGROWN’ EXTREMISM
IN THE UNITED STATES, at vi (2010).
103. See Richman, supra note 92 (“The police officer who seeks information from
a local Arab-American community leader has probably met and assisted that leader
before—protecting his property, ironing out some administrative complexity, or
ensuring his safe worship.”).
104. See KELLING & BRATTON, supra note 82, at 2 (“Local police officers . . . are
in a better position to know responsible leaders in the Islamic and Arabic
communities and can reach out to them for information or for help in developing
informants.”).
105. Id. at 2.
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Greater Accountability to Local Concerns

Finally, some scholars assert that local police departments may be
more accountable to the local community and local community
Some of the reasons underlying this greater
preferences.106
accountability include local elections, public opinion, civil society,
media pressure, and community relations that have been developed
and influence the direction of policing.107 Much of this is due to the
increased prevalence of the community policing model, which takes
into account the views and priorities of the local community to a great
extent.108 As a result of the growth of this model,
the last two decades have seen enormous and accelerating changes
in the readiness of urban police forces to solicit and address the
concerns of the people they serve. And solicitude for the concerns
of ethnic or racial minority groups . . . has increasingly become a
non-negotiable part of a police chief’s job description.109

An extension of this theory further holds that local communities
may actually work as a check on federal policies or priorities that they
view as too aggressive.110 One prominent post-9/11 example of this
type of local check on federal behavior is the Dearborn Police
Department’s qualified (and limited) participation in post-9/11
interviews conducted by the FBI.111 Another is the Portland Police
Department’s and other localities’ refusal to embed local officers on
the regional Joint Terrorism Task Force based on the voting of the
city council.112

106. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1737 (“[A] body of scholarship [that] identifies
the presence of a wide range of accountability mechanisms that cause local
counterterrorism officials to be more responsive to civil liberties.”).
107. See id. at 1736–40 (discussing the informal mechanisms and incentive
structures which may make local law enforcement more susceptible, and thus
accountable, to the opinions of the local community); see also Waxman, supra note
75, at 392 (noting that local police departments are subject to local budgetary
concerns, electoral concerns, and draw and train their forces mainly from and in the
community being served).
108. See generally Richman, supra note 92.
109. Id.
110. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1736 (“A small but significant body of
scholarship has coalesced around [this] view . . . .” (citing Susan N. Herman,
Collapsing Spheres: Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Federalism, and the War on Terror,
41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 941, 942 (2005); Susan N. Herman, Introduction to Our New
Federalism? National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1201, 1212–13 (2004); Tom Lininger, Federalism and Antiterrorism
Investigations, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 391, 393 (2006))).
111. See id. See generally Thacher, supra note 88, at 636 (describing the process
around which this policy developed).
112. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1736.
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Nevertheless, the benefits of this particular advantage should not
be oversold, particularly in the realm of counterterrorism
investigations, which “pulls on local policing that strain these systems
and patterns of political accountability.”113 In these cases, despite the
normal decentralized hierarchy of policing that typically holds true,
local law enforcement may have to defer to national priorities.114
Moreover, these informal checks may be less effective in reining in
the less publicized tactics that local police departments may seek to
implement to combat the terrorism threat, particularly that posed by
homegrown extremists.
Thus, while there may be “powerful
incentives for police officers to negotiate a middle road when it comes
to the more intrusive and potentially objectionable aspects of
counterterrorism” tactics, “it is hard to know whether this logic
dictates local restraint in the more elusive (and less overt) aspects of
intelligence collection that, at least in theory, are likely to remain
unknown to community members.”115 Despite the limitations of this
last advantage, however, we have seen from the discussion above that
“[l]ocal law enforcement is, in fact, uniquely positioned to identify
terrorist activity right here in [local] communities.”116

B.

The Legal Framework: The NYPD and Handschu: A Case
Study

1.

Background

Having reviewed the general advantages that local law
enforcement has in combating the homegrown terrorist threat, this
Part turns to how the NYPD operates in this environment as a
specific example.
It is important to note at the outset that New York City is a bit of
an exception on these issues for several reasons. On the one hand,
the NYPD has more resources and manpower than almost any other

113. Waxman, supra note 75, at 391.
114. See id. at 392 (“The police should not be responsive in an unlimited sense to
either the entire community or minority interests in the community. In many
situations it is essential that the police act independent of local community interests,
responding instead to state or federal laws that preempt local legislation and override
local preferences.”).
115. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1738–1739.
116. See NEU, supra note 77; see also Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1730 (“Local
counterterrorism intelligence has been uniquely well-positioned to see the emergence
of the [homegrown terrorism] threat on a micro level.”).

152

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

local law enforcement agency.117 On the other hand, the framework
under which the NYPD operates in this area is actually more
restrictive than most other local jurisdictions because the NYPD’s
investigations into political activity are governed by a federal consent
decree.118
The decree, which has become known as the “Handschu
Guidelines,”119 was agreed to initially in 1985 as a compromise
settlement to protracted litigation that began in 1971, when
individuals affiliated with several political action groups sued the City
and the NYPD for alleged violations of their civil rights.120 Among
the key features, the Guidelines established the parameters by which
the NYPD could conduct investigations into political activity. More
specifically, the initial version of the Guidelines required that the
police have specific information of criminal activity before initiating
an investigation, established an “Authority” to oversee those
investigations, and created a mechanism for New Yorkers who
believed they were aggrieved to seek redress.121

117. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEP’TS, 2007, at
34 (2010), available at vai ://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf.
118. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir.
2001) (stating that due to the consent decree, Chicago police “labor . . . under severe
handicaps that other American police are free from,” and that even after
modification, the consent “decree will leave the Chicago police under considerably
greater constraints than the police forces of other cities.”); see also Paul Chevigny,
Politics and Law in the Control of Local Surveillance, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 735
(1994) (discussing consent decrees imposed on other cities, including Chicago and
Memphis, for violations of civil rights that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s);
Raymond Kelly, Police Comm’r, N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, Remarks to Fordham Law
School Alumni, (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/pr/pr_2012_
03_03_remarks_to_fordham_law_school_alumni.shtml (noting that other police
departments are not limited by the rules in the Handschu Guidelines, “which restrict
police powers granted under the constitution”). Several other jurisdictions have been
subject to consent decrees with respect to investigations into political activity,
stemming from civil rights violations and litigation that occurred in the 1970s and
1980s. Jerrold L. Steigman, Reversing Reform: The Handschu Settlement in PostSeptember 11 New York City, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 745, 746 (2003).
119. See e.g., Handschu v. Special Servs. Div. (Handschu 2003), 288 F. Supp. 2d
411, 420–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (detailing the modified and superseding guidelines as
“Appendix A”); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div. (Hadschu 1985), 605 F. Supp. 1384,
1420–24 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (detailing the original provisions of the consent decree as
“Appendix A”).
120. See Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d 411 at 420–31 (detailing the modified and
superseding guidelines as “Appendix A”); Handschu 1985, 605 F. Supp. at 1420–24
(detailing the original provisions of the consent decree as “Appendix A”); Steigman,
supra note 118, at 746.
121. See Handschu 1985, 605 F. Supp. at 1420–24; Steigman, supra note 118, at
758–61 (summarizing the settlement).

2013] COMBATING HOMEGROWN EXTREMISM

153

In 2002, the NYPD petitioned for the Guidelines to be modified122
to enable the Department to combat the terrorist threat by allowing
the investigative threshold to shift from retroactive (“specific
information”) to anticipatory and preventive investigations.123 As
articulated in the “Preamble” to what would be adopted as the
modified Guidelines:
Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on the City of New York on
September 11, 2001 which resulted in the loss of thousands of lives
and the total destruction of the World Trade Center complex, it
became apparent that the City faces unprecedented threats to its
continued safety and security. In the view of federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies, the prevention of future attacks requires
the development of intelligence and the investigation of potential
terrorist activity before an unlawful act occurs.124

The Southern District of New York—in fact, the same judge who
issued the initial decision in 1985—agreed with the NYPD and
allowed modification of the Guidelines.125 Under the new guidelines,
the basis for initiating an investigation shifted from a reactive (or
retrospective) approach to an anticipatory one.126 While the initial
Guidelines required specific information of criminal activity before
commencing an investigation,127 the revised Guidelines state, “In its
effort to anticipate or prevent unlawful activity, including terrorist
acts, the NYPD must, at times, initiate investigations in advance of
unlawful conduct.128
The need to adopt this shift from a more reactive approach to an
anticipatory one was aptly articulated by Judge Posner, in an opinion

122. See Steigman, supra note 118, at 746; Kelly, supra note 118.
123. See, e.g., Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 420–31; Handschu 1985, 605 F.
Supp. at 1420–24.
124. Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (emphasis added).
125. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(granting the NYPD’s motion to modify the Handschu Guidelines), superseded in
part by Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d 411 (issuing the Second Revised Order and
Judgment.)
126. Compare Handschu 1985, 605 F. Supp. at 1390 (quoting Section IV(C) of the
Guidelines requiring “specific information” to commence an investigation), with
Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 421 (authorizing investigations “in advance of
unlawful conduct”).
127. See Handschu 1985, 605 F. Supp. at 1390 (“‘When specific information has
been received by the Police Department that a person or group engaged in political
activity is engaged in, about to engage in, or has threatened to engage in conduct
which constitutes a crime the PSS is authorized to commence an investigation of such
person or group.’” (quoting Section IV(C) of the Guidelines)).
128. Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 421 (emphasis added).
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that similarly allowed modification of the City of Chicago’s consent
decree in early 2001.129 In that decision, Judge Posner wrote:
The City [of Chicago] wants flexibility to meet new threats to the
safety of Chicago’s citizens . . . . Today the concern, prudent and not
paranoid, is with ideologically motivated terrorism.
The
City . . . wants to be able to keep tabs on incipient terrorist groups.
New groups of political extremists, believers in and advocates of
violence, form daily around the world. If one forms in or migrates
to Chicago, the decree renders the police helpless to do anything to
protect the public against the day when the group decides to commit
a terrorist act. Until the group goes beyond the advocacy of
violence and begins preparatory actions that might create
reasonable suspicion of imminent criminal activity, the hands of the
police are tied. And if the police have been forbidden to investigate
until then, if the investigation cannot begin until the group is well on
its way toward the commission of terrorist acts, the investigation
may come too late to prevent the acts or to identify the perpetrators.
If police get wind that a group of people have begun meeting and
discussing the desirability of committing acts of violence in pursuit
of an ideological agenda, a due regard for the public safety counsels
allowing the police department to monitor the statements of the
group’s members, to build a file, perhaps to plant an undercover
agent.130

2.

Investigations Under Current Handschu Guidelines

It is important to point out that the Guidelines apply only to
investigations involving political activity.131 At the same time, as
former Commissioner Kelly noted, the NYPD “imposed on
oursel[ves] the strictest interpretation of political activity . . . . We go
above and beyond by treating every terrorism investigation as subject
to Handschu.”132 As described above, the guiding principle of the
modified Handschu Guidelines is that the NYPD must have the
ability to investigate potential terrorist activity in advance of specific
information of that activity, while at the same time ensuring “that
investigations involving political activity conform to the guarantees of
the Constitution, that care be exercised in the conduct of those
investigations so as to protect constitutional rights, and that matters

129. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir.
2001).
130. Id. at 802 (emphasis added).
131. See Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 421–22.
132. See Kelly, supra note 118 (“One could easily argue that when we investigate
terrorism, we are dealing with criminal, not political, activity.”).

2013] COMBATING HOMEGROWN EXTREMISM

155

investigated be confined to those supported by a legitimate law
enforcement purpose.”133
To accomplish these goals, the Guidelines set out “three levels of
investigative activity . . . intended to provide the NYPD with the
necessary flexibility to act well in advance of the commission of
planned terrorist acts or other unlawful activity.”134 The four levels of
investigation, described further below, are: (1) Checking Leads, (2)
Preliminary Inquiries, (3) Investigation, and (4) Terrorism Enterprise
Investigation.135 All investigations except for leads must be submitted
in writing, with the requisite level of information, and approved by
the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence.136

a.

Leads

Checking leads is the “lowest level” of investigation.137 According
to the Guidelines, this type of investigation “should be undertaken
whenever information is received of such a nature that some followup as to the possibility of unlawful activity is warranted.”138 This is,
essentially, fundamental police work. One example of leads are tips,
such as calls in response to the “If You See Something, Say
Something!” campaign139 or calls from concerned friends and family.
Leads can also be based on information passed on to uniformed
officers who are “walking the beat” or otherwise present and
available to New York residents. The Guidelines dictate that leads
investigations “should be conducted with an eye toward promptly
determining whether” one of the next levels of investigation is
warranted.140

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 421.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 422–28 (detailing the levels of investigation).
See id. at 423–24, 427–28.
Id. at 422.
Id.
See Safeguard New York, N.Y. ST. DIV. HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY

SERVICES,
http://www.dhses.ny.gov/oct/safeguardny/documents/safeguard_fireems.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
140. JOHN ASHCROFT, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES
ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE
INVESTIGATION,
available
at
https://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/020530
generalcrimes2.pdf.
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Preliminary Inquiries

A Preliminary Inquiry, as the name suggests, is an intermediary
step between checking leads and a Full Investigation.141 The
threshold standard for initiating a preliminary inquiry is an
“allegation or information indicating the possibility of unlawful
activity” that should be investigated beyond just the checking of
leads.142 This level of investigation is intended to “allow[] the NYPD
to respond in a measured way to ambiguous or incomplete
information, with as little intrusion as the needs of the situation
permit.”143
Preliminary Inquiries are initially authorized for a six-month
period and may be extended for three-month intervals as long as the
need is justified and submitted in writing for approval.144 Most
standard investigative techniques are authorized under the
Preliminary Inquiry, including examination of NYPD records and
files, other government records and public records; interviews of
complainants and/or the subject(s); surveillance which does not
require a warrant; and use of undercover or confidential informants.145

c.

Full Investigations

The next and highest level of investigation is the Full
Investigation.146 The standard for a Full Investigation is “facts or
circumstances” that “reasonably indicate” criminal activity.147 While a
Full Investigation requires “an objective, factual” predicate, the
reasonable indication standard is explicitly described as “substantially
lower than probable cause.”148 Moreover, the reasonable indication
“standard . . . is satisfied where there is not yet a current substantive
or preparatory unlawful act, but facts or circumstances reasonably
indicate that such unlawful conduct will occur in the future.”149 The
police department may employ “[a]ny lawful investigative
141. Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 422 (noting that preliminary inquiries are
appropriate for “cases where the NYPD receives information or an allegation not
warranting an investigation . . . but whose responsible handling requires some further
scrutiny beyond the prompt and extremely limited checking out of initial leads”).
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 423.
145. Id. (finding that the exceptions which are not allowed are mail openings and
“eavesdropping and video surveillance”).
146. See id. at 424.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Id.
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technique . . . in a full investigation,” (subject to certain limitations in
the Guidelines).150 Full Investigations may be authorized for one year
and renewed for the same amount of time.151

d.

Terrorism Enterprise Investigations

A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation (TEI) is a specific type of
Full Investigation.152 While the standard for initiating a TEI is the
same as for a Full Investigation—i.e., a reasonable indication of
criminal activity153—TEIs are focused on groups that are or may be
engaged in terrorism.154 Specifically,
a terrorism enterprise investigation may be initiated when facts or
circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are
engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of (i) furthering political or
social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force,
violence or other unlawful acts; (ii) engaging in terrorism as defined
in N.Y. Penal Law § 490.05, or (iii) committing any offense
described in N.Y. Penal Law §§ 490.10, 490.15, 490.20, 490.25,
490.30, or 490.35, or other related statutes currently in effect or
subsequently enacted.155

This group-based focus of the TEI leads to several key differences
from a typical Full Investigation, including: a focus on the nature,
history, and goals of the group and the threat it presents; continuation
of the investigation even after one or more of the group members
have been prosecuted for a crime; and lengthy investigations lasting
several years.156 In short, TEIs are “broader and less discriminate
than usual, involving the interrelation of various sources and types of
information.”157 Some of the factors that may be considered to
determine whether a group or organization “is pursuing terrorist
activities or objectives”158 that rise to the level of the threshold
standard include: (1) engaging in, threatening, or advocating violence,
(2) “apparent ability or intent to carry out violence” or other covered
activities, and (3) statements or actions by the group which “suggest
potential unlawful acts” that fall under the definition of the
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 424–25 (“A terrorism enterprise investigation is a full investigation
but differs from a general investigation . . . in several important respects.”).
153. Id. at 422.
154. See id. at 425 (describing “two or more persons . . . engaged in an enterprise”).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 426.
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standard.159 Just as a TEI’s threshold standard mirrors a Full
Investigation, so does its authorization and renewal procedures. To
wit, a TEI may be authorized for a year and renewed for the same
amount of time.160

e.

Investigative Techniques

To conduct the above outlined investigations, “the NYPD may use
any lawful investigative technique” allowed by the Guidelines.161
Which technique(s) to actually employ is left to the judgment of the
officer(s) running the investigation, based on a number of factors and
considerations, including:
(i) the objectives of the investigation and available investigative
resources;
(ii) the intrusiveness of a technique, considering such factors as the
effect on the privacy of individuals and potential damage to
reputation;
(iii) the seriousness of the unlawful act; and
(iv) the strength of the information indicating its existence or future
commission of the unlawful act.162

Moreover, the NYPD should try to use the least intrusive technique
that would still be effective; however, the Department should not
avoid a technique if it is warranted under the circumstances.163
The Guidelines specifically authorize the use of undercover officers
and/or confidential informants as an approved investigative
technique, “when such operations are the most effective means of
obtaining information, taking into account all of the circumstances of
the investigation, including the need for the information and the
seriousness of the threat.”164

3.

Other Authorizations Under Handschu

Apart from the rules governing investigations, Handschu imparts
several other authorizations that are instrumental in the police
department’s ability to “proactively draw on available sources of

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. at 427.
Id.
Id. at 428.
Id.
Id.
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information to identify terrorist threats and activities.”165 It is crucial
to bear in mind that the authorized activities discussed below do not
have to be part of the investigative procedures described above and
“include both activities that are . . . useful for law enforcement
purposes in both terrorism and non-terrorism contexts.”166 There are
five key authorized activities, each of which are discussed in turn.
First, the NYPD may “operate and participate in identification,
tracking, and information systems for the purpose of identifying and
locating potential terrorists and supporters of terrorist activity,
assessing and responding to terrorist risks and threats, or otherwise
detecting, prosecuting, or preventing terrorist activities.”167 The
information in these systems may come from “any source permitted
by law,” such as information gleaned in the course of current or past
investigations; information provided by other government entities
(including foreign intelligence), publicly available information, and
information voluntarily provided to the police.168
Second, “[f]or the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist
activities, the NYPD is authorized to visit any place and attend any
event that is open to the public, on the same terms and conditions as
members of the public generally.”169 This means that NYPD officers
may go anywhere that anybody else can go, with or without a lead,
preliminary inquiry, full investigation, or TEI as a predicate.170 This
authorization is key to understanding the operation of the
Demographics Unit, which was a small unit of plainclothes officers—
not undercovers171—who visited only public places “to determine how

165. Id. at 429 (“This Part accordingly identifies a number of authorized activities
which further this end, and which can be carried out even in the absence of a
checking of leads, preliminary inquiry, or full investigation as described in these
guidelines.”).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 429–30.
168. Id. at 430.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 429–30 (placing the authority to visit public places and events within
“[t]his Part [of the Guidelines, which] identifies a number of authorized activities
which . . . can be carried out even in the absence of a checking of leads, preliminary
inquiry, or full investigation as described in these guidelines”).
171. See Mitchell D. Silber, Who Will Defend the Defenders?, COMMENTARY
MAG. (June 1, 2012), http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/who-will-defendthe-defenders/ (noting that with only sixteen plainclothes officers at its largest, the
Demographics did not—indeed, could not—engage in “blanket . . . surveillance” of
these communities). Contra Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, With CIA Help,
NYPD Moves Covertly in Muslim Areas, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 23, 2011,
http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-in-the-News/2011/With-CIA-help-NYPD-movescovertly-in-Muslim-areas.
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individuals seeking to do harm might communicate or conceal
themselves. Where might they go to find resources or evade the law?
Establishing this kind of geographically-based knowledge saves
precious time in stopping fast-moving plots.”172 Indeed, as discussed
earlier, this ability to “understand the relationships within the
community” has often been considered one of local law
enforcement’s comparative advantages.173 As one commentator has
written,
Because local police, unlike the FBI, have a broader law and order
and public service mandate, their routine activities tend to penetrate
more widely and deeply into community groups, including civic and
religious organizations. Indeed, this is one of the features that make
local police potentially valuable from a counterterrorism
perspective.174

Third, the police department can “carry out general topical
research” as if they were members of the public. 175 This research may
include “conducting online searches and accessing online sites and
forums.”176 The fourth authorization applies the same standard to
online activity in general.177
Specifically, NYPD officers are
authorized under the Handschu Guidelines to search extremist
Internet sites and/or forums to “develop[] intelligence information to
detect or prevent terrorism or other unlawful activity.”178
Finally, “[t]he NYPD is authorized to prepare general reports and
assessments concerning terrorism or other unlawful activities for
purposes of strategic or operational planning or in support of other
legitimate law enforcement activities.”179
IV. PROSECUTION
After detect, disrupt, and detain, the final step in the process is to
prosecute. Although terrorism prosecutions remain largely the

172. Kelly, supra note 118.
173. Waxman, supra note 75, at 399.
174. Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, it is somewhat ironic that recent criticism of
the NYPD’s counterterrorism strategies has focused so much on its Demographics
program, which was designed to do that very thing. See Chris Hawley et. al.,
Highlights of AP’s Pulitzer Prize-Winning Probe into NYPD Intelligence Operations,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, http://www.ap.org/media-center/nypd/investigation (last visited
Oct. 9, 2013).
175. Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d 411, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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province of federal prosecutors, 180 a number of states passed their
own terrorism criminal statutes in the wake of 9/11, and there are at
least two recent examples of New York City invoking New York’s
terrorism criminal statute.181 Moreover, cases that are prosecuted at
the federal level may be initiated based on information detected at
the local level.182 Finally, there appears to be a recent, and perhaps
growing, trend of using certain long-standing criminal statutes of
general application to combat Internet radicalization, which, as
discussed above in Part II(b), remains a significant source of
extremism. These statutes also seem particularly well-suited to
prosecuting so-called lone wolves or homegrown extremists for whom
the absence of established terrorist ties may make it more difficult to
prosecute using the more traditional anti-terrorism statutes discussed
below in Part IV.B.1.183
A. State Level Prosecutions

1.

Ahmed Ferhani

Ahmed Ferhani is a New York City resident who was arrested by
the NYPD on May 11, 2011 in New York City after trying to purchase
three semi-automatic guns, ammunition, and a grenade in a sting
operation.184 The NYPD’s months-long investigation, which included

180. Waxman, supra note 75, at 384 (“Most criminal prosecutions for crimes
directly related to terrorism are investigated and prosecuted at the federal level.
Federal investigative and prosecutorial capabilities are vast and sophisticated, while
federal prosecutorial antiterrorism statutes and the high profile of such crimes push
the prosecution of terrorism crimes at the federal rather than state and local levels.”
(internal citations omitted)).
181. See e.g., People v. Ferhani, No. 2461/11, 2012 WL 6554892 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2012); Complaint, People v. Pimentel (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Nov. 20, 2011) [hereinafter
Pimentel Complaint], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2011/jose_
pimentel_complaint.pdf.
182. See discussion infra Part IV.B.4 on the Jesse Morton prosecution, which
began with a NYPD investigation into Morton’s organization.
183. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and
the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 436–46, 493 (2007)
(discussing the declining utility of FTO-support prosecutions to “unaffiliated”
terrorists, and noting that 18 U.S.C. § 2339A may apply even more broadly than
inchoate conspiracy charges, “but by shifting the point of potential prosecutorial
intervention further back along the continuum between thought and deed, the statute
entails a variety of offsetting costs”).
184. Press Release, Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., N.Y. Cnty. Dist. Attorney, First Terrorist
Convicted on State Terror Charges Sentenced to Decade in Prison for 2011 Plot to
Attack Manhattan Synagogues (Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://manhattanda.org/
press-release/first-terrorist-convicted-state-terror-charges-sentenced-decade-prison2011-plot-attac.
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the use of an undercover officer who became close to Ferhani,
revealed Ferhani’s intention to blow up a Synagogue and kill Jews
because of the violent ideology he espoused.185 Ferhani was charged
with a number of crimes, including two under New York State’s
terrorism statute—the first state-level prosecution ever brought under
the statute.186 Rather than being a self-standing offense, the statute
operates as an “add-on” or enhancement to an underlying offense. It
reads:
A person is guilty of a crime of terrorism when, with intent to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a
unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the
conduct of a unit of government by murder, assassination or
kidnapping, he or she commits a specified offense.187

The statute was satisfied in this case, the prosecution argued,
because Ferhani and Mamdouh intended to coerce New York’s
Jewish population and perhaps even influence U.S. foreign policy
toward Muslims through the bombing.188 As Manhattan District
Attorney Cyrus Vance, who brought the groundbreaking charges, put
it, “They did it for jihad, something they referred simply to as the
cause, which meant the violence and armed fight against Israel, Jews
and other non-Muslims and the West.”189
Another historic first for the statute occurred nearly two years
later, when Ferhani pled guilty to four counts in the indictment,
including two of the “crimes of terrorism” charges.190 Vance
characterized the sentencing and use of the state terrorism law with
the following:
Today’s sentencing marks an important first for local law
enforcement officials in New York State. This defendant was
convicted and sentenced under anti-terrorism laws that enabled
local police and prosecutors to protect our communities from

185. See Complaint, People v. Ferhani (N.Y. Crim. Ct. May 12, 2011), available at
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1591.pdf.
186. William K. Rashbaum & Al Baker, Suspects in Terror Case Wanted to Kill
Jews, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/
nyregion/two-men-arrested-in-new-york-terror-case-police-say.html?pagewanted=
all) (“[Ferhani and Mamdouh] were charged in a criminal complaint under a state
terrorism statute passed after the Sept. 11 attacks that Mr. Vance said had not been
used before in New York City in a terrorism case.”).
187. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25 (McKinney 2008).
188. See Press Release, supra note 184 (noting that “Ferhani conspired to bomb
synagogues in Manhattan to send a message of violence to non-Muslims, including
Americans, Christians, and Jews.”).
189. Rashbaum & Baker, supra note 186.
190. See Press Release, supra note 184.
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terrorist threats. Violent plots like Ahmed Ferhani’s endanger all
New Yorkers. Fortunately, as a result of the collaboration between
state prosecutors and local police, we prevented him from carrying
out his violent plan against our City.191

Perhaps for the first time in a terrorism prosecution, the U.S.
Attorney and the FBI were not mentioned in that equation.192

2.

Jose Pimentel

While it took nearly a decade for the first charges to be brought
under New York’s terrorism statute, the second was not far behind.
On November 19, 2011, the NYPD arrested Jose Pimentel as he was
in the process of finalizing construction of three bombs.193 Three of
the five counts charged against Pimentel included the state terrorism
enhancement: criminal possession of a weapon as a crime of
terrorism, conspiracy as a crime of terrorism, and soliciting or
providing support for an act of terrorism.194
The NYPD’s investigation of Pimentel was approximately a year
long and involved many of the techniques available under
Handschu.195 In particular, the NYPD used a confidential informant
to get close to Pimentel and also closely monitored Pimentel’s
Internet presence.196 Both the interpersonal interactions and the
websites evinced a violent, jihadist mindset. For example, the
investigative detective on the case stated that he “reviewed internet
postings from the defendant, both on a website maintained by him
and on blogs, in which the defendant described his support of the
terrorist organization Al-Qaeda and his belief in violent jihad.”197
Pimentel’s “True Islam” website included a link to Inspire
magazine’s article entitled How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of

191. Id. (emphasis added).
192. See Rashbaum & Baker, supra note 186 (“The case was presented in State
Supreme Court, with no involvement from the F.B.I. or the United States attorney’s
office, typically crucial in such investigations and prosecutions.”).
193. Pimentel Complaint supra note 181, at 5; Richard Esposito & Mark Schone,
Alleged ‘Lone Wolf’ Arrested in New York on Terror Charges, ABC NEWS (Nov. 20,
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/alleged-lone-wolf-jose-pimentel-arrested-yorkterror/story?id=14994845.
194. See Pimentel Complaint, supra note 181, at 1.
195. See id. at 3 (noting that the investigation lasted approximately twelve months
and involved monitoring the defendant’s internet activity and use of a confidential
informant).
196. See id.
197. Id.
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your Mom.198 As discussed previously, Inspire is Awlaki’s and alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s online magazine, which is meant to
encourage Muslims in the West to take action without any training or
coordination from al-Qaeda.199 The magazine lived up to its name in
Pimentel’s case, as the investigation revealed that he methodically
followed the instructions in the article to make his bombs.200
Pimentel’s potential targets for the bombs, based on conversations
that he had with the informant, may have included government and
police buildings, banks, and U.S. servicemen who had served in Iraq
and/or Afghanistan.201
In many ways, the Pimentel investigation epitomizes the problems
facing law enforcement and the opportunity for local involvement: a
homegrown loner who appears to have been largely radicalized online
but has access to “virtual training” and inspiration. Based on a tip
from another local law enforcement agency,202 the NYPD was able to
detect, disrupt, and detain him before he could act on his violent
intentions.
B.

Federal Criminal Statutes

1.

Background

Just as law enforcement’s approach to terrorism-related cases
switched to a more proactive approach post 9/11, so too did federal
prosecutors.203 As then-Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty said
in a 2006 speech:

198. Id. According to the Complaint, Pimentel also provided a flash drive
containing copy of the article directly to the NYPD informant, along with two bombmaking manuals.
199. See Complaint ¶ 48, United States v. Morton, No. 1:12cr35 (E.D. Va. 2011)
[hereinafter Morton Complaint] (noting that “[t]he stated purpose of Inspire was to
inspire English-speaking Muslims to support al-Qaeda and engage in jihad.”); Black,
supra note 69, at 2.
200. Pimentel Complaint, supra note 181, at 4–5.
201. See id. at 3–4.
202. See Esposito & Schone, supra note 193 (“Pimentel first came to the attention
of authorities in May 2009, when he was living in Schenectady, N.Y. He returned to
New York City in January 2010. Authorities say they have been tailing him for more
than a year.”).
203. See Chesney, supra note 183, at 427 (outlining “the emergence of a preference
for early prosecutorial intervention in terrorism investigations within the United
States”); Kelly Moore, The Role of Federal Criminal Prosecutions in the War on
Terrorism, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 837, 838–839 (“In the immediate aftermath of
September 11, 2001, the government made a dramatic shift in its approach to
terrorism prosecutions.” (citations omitted)).
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The extent of September 11th’s impact on the Department of Justice
cannot be overstated. The magnitude of that day’s tragedy
transformed our counterterrorism strategy. On every level, we
committed to a new strategy of prevention. The 9/11 attacks shifted
the law enforcement paradigm from one of predominantly reaction
to one of proactive prevention. We resolved not to wait for an
attack or an imminent threat of an attack to investigate or
prosecute . . . .
In the wake of September 11, this aggressive, proactive, and
preventative course is the only acceptable response from a
department of government charged with enforcing our laws and
protecting the American people. Awaiting an attack is not an
option. That is why the Department of Justice is doing everything in
its power to identify risks to our Nation’s security at the earliest
stage possible and to respond with forward-leaning—preventative—
prosecutions.204

Two of the more frequently used statutes to prosecute terrorism
are the two material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (“Providing
material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist
organizations”) and 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (“Providing material support
to terrorists”). The first, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, makes it illegal to
provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist
organization (FTO).205 The second, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, criminalizes
the provision of material support to terrorists.206 Both statutes
criminalize a broad range of underlying conduct, making them useful
for accomplishing the Department’s stated goal of preventive
prosecution.207
However, they increasingly have limitations,
particularly as applied to self-radicalized terrorists who lack a
connection to a designated terrorist organization.208 The growth of
the Internet-based threat, where someone can learn how to conduct
an attack and also receive moral support without ever connecting
with a designated FTO,209 only heightens this limitation. Especially
because, as one FBI official put it, “‘Individuals . . . who encourage

204. Paul McNulty, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at the American Enterprise
Institute, (May 24, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/speeches/
2006/dag_speech_060524.html.
205. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012).
206. See id. § 2339A.
207. See Chesney, supra note 183, at 436 (discussing § 2339B), 493 (noting the
features of the statute that “make[] § 2339A a very attractive and useful charge from
the point of view of prevention”).
208. See id. at 445.
209. See discussion of online radicalization supra Part II(b).
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violence and create fear over the Internet are a danger to our society
and to the freedoms we enjoy as citizens.’”210
After the September 11 attacks, the Justice Department has also
sought to use “every available federal criminal statute . . . to detect,
prevent, disrupt, and deter terrorism.”211
The remainder of this paper will focus on what appears to be an
emerging trend of using three such statutes that may be particularly
useful in combating the increasing threat posed by homegrown
extremists who engage in terrorist activity over the Internet.212 Those
statutes are: (1) Dissemination of Bomb-Making Material or
Information;213 (2) Communicating Threats;214 and (3) Soliciting

210. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of Va., Leader of
Revolution Muslim Pleads Guilty to Using Internet to Solicit Murder and Encourage
Violent Extremism (Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/
news/2012/02/20120209mortonnr.html (quoting Assistant FBI Director in Charge of
the Washington Field Office James W. McJunkin).
211. See Moore, supra note 203, at 839.
212. As with any statute that criminalizes conduct taking the form of speech, the
attempt to combat the increasing threat of radicalization online inevitably raises free
speech concerns. A full explication of those issues is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, “there is little dispute that Congress may enact laws that regulate and even
prohibit speech under some circumstances.” CHARLES DOYLE, BOMB-MAKING
ONLINE: AN ABRIDGED SKETCH OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 4 (2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21616.pdf.
In particular, “[i]f the speech in
question is an integral part of a transaction involving conduct the government
otherwise is empowered to prohibit, such ‘speech acts’ typically may be proscribed
without much, if any, concern about the First Amendment, since it is merely
incidental that such ‘conduct’ takes the form of speech.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF BOMBMAKING INFORMATION, THE EXTENT TO
WHICH ITS DISSEMINATION IS CONTROLLED BY FEDERAL LAW, AND THE EXTENT TO
WHICH SUCH DISSEMINATION MAY BE SUBJECT TO REGULATION CONSISTENT WITH
THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 35 (1997), available at
http://cryptome.org/abi.htm. As the Second Circuit stated in affirming Omar Abdel
Rahman’s conviction on multiple counts of solicitation,
Freedom of speech and of religion do not extend so far as to bar prosecution
of one who uses a public speech or a religious ministry to commit crimes.
Numerous crimes under the federal criminal code are, or can be, committed
by speech alone . . . Notwithstanding that political speech and religious
exercise are among the activities most jealously guarded by the First
Amendment, one is not immunized from prosecution for such speech-based
offenses merely because one commits them through the medium of political
speech or religious preaching. Of course, courts must be vigilant to insure
that prosecutions are not improperly based on the mere expression of
unpopular ideas. But if the evidence shows that the speeches crossed the
line into criminal solicitation, procurement of criminal activity, or
conspiracy to violate the laws, the prosecution is permissible.
United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 117 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing United States v.
Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 169–71 (1st Cir. 1969)).
213. See 18 U.S.C. § 842(p) (2012).
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Others to Threaten Violence.215 Robust prosecution of Internetbased radicalization using these statutes will go a long way toward
implementing the pledge of one FBI official that “[u]sing broad-based
communication channels to threaten, harm and intimidate and the
incite others to do the same will not be tolerated.”216

2.

Dissemination of Bomb Making Material/Information

Perhaps one of the most powerful tools available to federal
prosecutors in this context is 18 U.S.C. § 842(p),217 which criminalizes
the teaching, demonstrating or dissemination of information related
to manufacturing explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of
mass destruction if the information is distributed while either
knowing or intending that “the information be used for, or in
furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of
violence.”218 The statute was enacted in response to the 1995
Oklahoma City bombing, after which instructions for making similar
bombs had been quickly posted on the Internet following the
attack.219
Importantly, in United States v. Sherman Austin—the first case
brought under this statute—the distribution element of the statute
appears to have been satisfied merely by linking on the Internet to an
explosives manual.220 The statute also carries a maximum prison
sentence of twenty years,221 meaning that potential terrorists may be
taken off the street for quite a long time. However, the statute does
not appear to have been frequently used since its enactment in 1999.

214. See id. § 875(c).
215. See id. § 373.
216. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Virginia Man Pleads Guilty to Providing
Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Encouraging Violent
Jihadists to Kill U.S. Citizens (Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2010/October/10-nsd-1174.html (citing statement of Acting Assistant Director
in Charge of the FBI Washington Field Office John G. Perren).
217. See Senator Feinstein Urges Department of Justice to Aggressively Enforce
Bombmaking Statute, PROJECT VOTE SMART (Sept. 3, 2003), available at
http://votesmart.org/public-statement/20372/#.UlbIhSSE41o (referring to the statute,
which Sen. Feinstein co-sponsored, as “an important anti-terrorism tool”).
218. 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2) (2012).
219. DOYLE, supra note 212, at 2.
220. See Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order, United States v. Austin,
No. 2:02-cr-00884 (C.D. Cal Aug. 14, 2003); Senator Feinstein Urges Department of
Justice to Aggressively Enforce Bombmaking Statute, supra note 217 (noting that
Sherman Austin, the first person prosecuted under the statute, was “an anarchist who
put links to bombmaking information on his website”).
221. 18 U.S.C. § 844 (2012).
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As Senator Feinstein, one of its original co-sponsors, lamented when
Austin was sentenced in 2003, “the Department of Justice needs to do
a better job making prosecutors aware of” the statute, which “has
been little used.”222
The Department’s view and awareness of the statute may be
changing, however. In July 2011, Emerson Begolly, a homegrown
extremist from Pennsylvania, was indicted on two counts, including a
violation of 842(p)(2)(A).223
According to the indictment, in
December 2010, “Begolly . . . posted links to . . . a 101-page document
that contains information on how to set up a laboratory, conduct basic
chemistry, and manufacture explosives.”224 The document was
supposedly written by a top al-Qaeda chemical weapons expert and
was posted on a known jihadist web forum225—in other words, where
the audience would be receptive to his message. Moreover, the
Indictment notes that shortly after Begolly posted the links to the
website, he posted a follow-up message that urged others to take
caution—both security precautions in downloading and physical
caution when following the instructions—so that he did not have to
read about a “Suspected Islamist killed while mixing chemicals for
bombmaking.”226
Similar to the charges brought against Sherman Austin for
disseminating bomb-making information via links to bomb-making
manuals on his website, the Begolly indictment also seems to indicate
that merely linking to an explosives manual or other bomb-making
information online amounts to “dissemination” under the statute.
That means that under those circumstances charges could be brought
under 842(p) as long as there also is sufficient evidence to prove the
“intent” prong of the statute. This, in turn, suggests that it may be
possible to prosecute Internet extremists like Jose Pimentel, who post
or link to issues of Inspire containing the “How to Make a Bomb in
the Kitchen of your Mom” or similar articles if the requisite intent
can be proved. The full weight of the legal theory was not tested in

222. Senator Feinstein Urges Department of Justice to Aggressively Enforce
Bombmaking Statute, supra, note 217 (referring to the statute, which Sen. Feinstein
co-sponsored, as “an important anti-terrorism tool”).
223. See Indictment at 1, United States v. Begolly, 1:11-cr-326 (E.D. Va. 2011)
[hereinafter Begolly Indictment].
224. Id. at 5.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 5–6.
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the Begolly case, however, as the 842(p) charge ultimately was not
included as part of his guilty plea.227

3.

Solicitation

One of the charges to which Begolly did plead guilty was “soliciting
others to engage in acts of terrorism . . . ”228 which was a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 373(a).229 Under that statute, it is a crime to “solicit[],
command[],induce[], or otherwise endeavor[] to persuade” another
person to commit a felony with the intent that that person actually
commit the felony.230 This crime often includes solicitation and/or
persuasion in the form of speech.231 Although the “prototypical
solicitation case” usually involves some type of inducement or threat
as well as directing the solicitation at a particular person, as discussed
infra, those are not hard and fast requirements.232
The solicitation charge against Begolly centered on several
Internet postings he made on a jihadist Internet forum encouraging
others to attack targets within the United States and, importantly,
specified both the type of targets and also the tactics to be used.233 In
one example, Begolly posted about how easy it is in the United States
to buy a gun “even if this person IS on the ‘terror watch’ list” and
encouraged
others
to
“take
advantage
of
this
and
MOVE . . . MOVE . . . MOVE!!!”234 He then followed that advice
with the following: “A successful lone-wolf attack, when even kills 1
or 2 or 3 of the kuffar is BETTER THAN and [sic]
UNSUCCESSFUL massive attack which also results in your own
227. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Pennsylvania Man Pleads Guilty to
Terrorist Solicitation and Firearms Offense (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2011/August/11-nsd-1028.html (noting the solicitation charge and firearms
charge but not dissemination of bombmaking).
228. Id.
229. 18 U.S.C. § 373 (2012).
230. Id.
231. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 212, at 11 (citing United States v. McNeill,
887 F.2d 448, 450–52 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88,
117 (2d Cir. 1999).
232. The cases discussed in this Part address terrorism-related solicitation via the
Internet. However, the history of using this statute to prosecute terrorism-related
solicitation—even absent a specific target of the solicitation—goes back at least a
decade. For example, in 2002, Ahmed Abdel Sattar—a cohort of the Blind Sheikh
Omar Abdel Rahman—was successfully charged with Solicitation of Crimes of
Violence for his role in helping to distribute a fatwa calling for Muslims to kill Jews
“wherever they are.” See Indictment at 16, United States v. Satter, No. 02-cr-395
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2010).
233. See Begolly Indictment, supra note 223 at 2–5.
234. Id. at 5.
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arrest . . . .”235 Thus Begolly was successfully charged with solicitation
even though there was no positive or negative inducement included in
his solicitation and he was not directing the solicitation to anyone in
particular.236 Indeed, the fact that he was addressing a wide audience
on a known extremist forum rather than one specific individual may
have actually increased the seriousness of the threat.237
Nor is Begolly the only terrorism defendant who was successfully
charged in this manner. Another prominent example is Zachary
Chesser, another extremist convert who operated his own blog that
was “dedicated to those who give their blood for Islam”238 and
“primarily devoted to spreading knowledge regarding Jihad and the
Mujahideen.”239 Chesser was arrested by the FBI on July 21, 2010 and
ultimately charged with solicitation of others to violence, attempting
to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, and
communication of threats.240
The core of the solicitation charge against Chesser focused on a
group of five Internet posts to his own blog as well as several other
jihadist forums between January and June 2010.241 Three of these
postings involved potential ways to attack the U.S. aviation
industry.242 Specifically, Chesser posted a link on his blog to a U.S.
Transportation and Security Administration manual detailing certain
screening procedures.243 He then posted on two extremist forums a
link to more than 200 “books on Jihad, Islam and Warfare,” including
one that had “information on the construction of antiaircraft missiles
and tactics, techniques and weapons for targeting aircraft, including
jet airplanes and helicopters.”244
The second group of postings involved “desensitizing” law
enforcement to the dangers of explosive packages by encouraging
people to plant suspicious packages that were in reality harmless.245
235. Id.
236. There is no mention in the Begolly Indictment of an inducement to act or a
request that any particular person on the forum be the individual to act. See generally

id.
237. See e.g., Complaint at 11–12, United States v. Chesser, No. 1:10-CR-395 (E.D.
Va. 2010) [hereinafter Chesser Complaint] (noting that Chesser’s audience was a
factor in determining whether his actions constituted a threat).
238. Id. at 2–3.
239. Id.
240. See generally id.
241. See Chesser Complaint, supra note 237, at 13–15.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 13–14.
244. Id. at 13–15.
245. Id.
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This is essentially a “boy who cried wolf” scenario, in which law
enforcement would become complacent and thus susceptible to a real
explosives package.246 As the Complaint describes the post, Chesser
explained that “after law enforcement had become sufficiently
‘desensitized’ to the possible danger of such packages, they would be
vulnerable to a real explosive . . . boom! No more kuffar.”247
According to the Criminal Information filed in the case, “[t]he term
‘kuffar,’ meaning unbeliever, or disbeliever, refers to an individual
who is not a Muslim.”248
It is interesting to note that while Chesser’s posts had a high degree
of specificity in terms of the targets and tactics he was soliciting, there
was no inducement (positive or negative) and the solicitation was not
directed at any person in particular.249 Instead, as with Begolly, the
fact that it was addressed to a wider audience on extremist websites
known to be supportive of Jihad seemed to enhance rather than
diminish the threat.250

4.

Communicating Threats

Chesser also was charged with and pleaded guilty to a count of
Communicating Threats, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which criminalizes the
use of interstate or foreign commerce to communicate a threat to
kidnap or injure another person.251 In order to show a violation of
this statute, the government must prove three things: “(1) a
transmission in interstate [or foreign] commerce; (2) a communication
containing a threat; and (3) [that] the threat [was one] to injure [or
kidnap] the person of another.”252 To survive First Amendment

246. See Press Release, supra note 216 (“Chesser explained . . . that once law
enforcement was desensitized, a real explosive could be used.”).
247. Chesser Complaint, supra note 237, at 15.
248. Id. at 1.
249. As was the case with the Begolly Complaint, there is no mention in the
Chesser Complaint of any inducement, or that his exhortations to act were directed at
any particular person. See generally id.
250. Although this was explicitly a factor in the communicating threats charge, it
seems possible that it also played a role in measuring the significance of the
solicitation charge as well. See id. at 11–12.
251. See 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012) (“Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign
commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any
threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.”).
252. United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1380 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (citations
omitted), aff’d, United States v. Baker, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997); see also 1072,
Special Considerations in Proving a Threat, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01072.htm (last visited Nov. 11,
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scrutiny, the threat communicated must be a “true threat,”253 meaning
“unequivocal, unconditional and specific expressions of intention
immediately to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals.”254 In addition, the threat should
be viewed objectively and in context, rather than subjectively.255 Nor
does it matter whether the person making the threat intended to carry
it out.256
In Chesser’s case, the charges stemmed from statements that he
posted on the Revolution Muslim website257 and other known Islamic
extremist forums in response to an episode of the television show
South Park, which Chesser believed insulted and defamed the
Prophet Mohamed.258 The key statements underpinning the threat,
according to the Complaint, included: (1) stating that the creators of
the show will end up like Theo Van Gogh, the Dutch filmmaker
murdered in 2004 by a Muslim extremist for making a film critical of
Islam, as well as posting a picture of his murder; (2) posting sermons
and statements by Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki justifying
and calling for the murder of anyone who defames Muhammad; (3)
posting a home and business address for the show’s creators and
suggesting that readers “pay them a visit;” and (4) obtaining and then
posting the contact information for several individuals who joined a
Facebook group established in solidarity with the show’s creators with
the comment, “Just a place to start.”259
According to the
Government, the threatening nature of the comments above was
amplified specifically because he posted the comments on websites
that had wide audiences and could be considered predisposed to
respond to his exhortations with violence.260 Chesser understood this
2013) (outlining relevant elements and issues associated with proving violations of
the statute).
253. See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (quoting Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)), aff’d, United States v. Baker, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir.
1997).
254. Affidavit of Paula R. Menges ¶ 26, United States v. Morton, No. 1:11mj386
(E.D Va. May 13, 2011) [hereinafter Menges Affidavit]; see also Baker, 890 F. Supp.
1375, 1382 (defining true threat as “unequivocal, unconditional and specific
expressions of intention immediately to inflict injury” (citation omitted)).
255. See Menges Affidavit, supra note 254, ¶ 28; Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1380.
256. See id. ¶ 28.
257. See Chesser Complaint, supra note 237, at 8.
258. See id. (“Chesser’s assert[ed] that the South Park episode went beyond
showing [Muhammad] . . . it outright insulted him . . . .” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
259. See id. at 7–11.
260. See id. at 11–12 (“[T]he postings on the internet by Chesser objectively
constituted messages to an audience that likely included individuals around the world
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as well, saying at one point “that posting the statement on the Ansar
Al Jihad Network would ‘scare the kuffar.’”261
Chesser made the above statement to Jesse Morton, a New York
City-based Muslim convert who founded the extremist group
“Revolution Muslim.”262 Morton himself was charged with and “pled
guilty . . . to using his position as a leader of Revolution Muslim
Organization’s internet sites to conspire to solicit murder, make
threatening communications and use the internet to place others in
fear.”263
According to the prosecuting attorney, “Jesse Morton operated
Revolution Muslim to radicalize those who saw and heard his
materials online and to incite them to engage in violence against those
they believed to be enemies of Islam.”264 As described in greater
detail in the Statement of Facts in the complaint:
Morton and his associates in the Revolution Muslim
organization . . . used the organization’s websites to encourage
Muslims to support Usama bin Laden, Anwar Al-Awlaki, al-Qaida,
the Taliban, and other Muslims engaged in or espousing jihad. They
encouraged Muslims to prepare for and engage in jihad against
those they believed to be enemies of Islam.265

One of the counts was based on Morton’s role, in cooperation with
Chesser, in communicating the threats in the South Park affair.266
Among other things, Morton worked closely with Chesser to write
and edit multiple drafts of the so-called “Clarifying Statement,” which

who: (A) were inclined to engage in violent jihad against what they believed to be the
enemies of Islam; (B) understood the messages to constitute requests to attack [the
South Park creators and members of the Facebook Group]; and (C) could potentially
be willing and capable to attack [those individuals] in response to those messages.”).
261. Morton Complaint, supra note 199, ¶ 40.
262. According to the Statement of Facts accompanying Morton’s guilty plea, he
“admitted that the Revolution Muslim websites contained the writings of and/or
contributed to the radicalization of” at least nine people, including Colleen R.
LaRose (a.k.a. Jihad Jane) and Samir Khan, the former New York City resident who
is largely credited with creating and publishing Inspire before he was killed in a drone
strike in Yemen alongside AQAP leader Anwar Al-Awlaki. See Press Release, supra
note 210; see also Aaron Y. Zelin, American Jihadi: The Death of Samir Khan in
Yemen Marks the End of a Key Figure in the Internet Jihad, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept.
30, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/samir_khan_dead_inspire
_magazine.
263. See Press Release, supra note 210.
264. See id.
265. Morton Complaint, supra note 199, ¶ 3.
266. See id. ¶¶ 29–44. The other counts not discussed herein relate to threats to
Jewish organizations made in posts to Revolution Muslim by its other co-founder and
which Morton approved of as administrator of the website. See id. ¶¶ 18–28.
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ultimately reiterated their belief that insulting the Prophet
Muhammad was sufficient justification for murder, quoting Osama
Bin Laden to support their argument.267
Morton also was charged for his role in communicating the threats
to the creator of the “Everybody Draw Muhammad Day” Facebook
group.268 Specifically, about a month after the Facebook page was
created, Morton posted to Revolution Muslim an audio file of one of
his speeches in which he stated that Islamic law justifies killing
anyone who insults the Prophet Muhammad and calling on people
listening to “fight the disbelievers near you.”269 Morton also posted a
link on Revolution Muslim to the first issue of Inspire which, in
addition to containing the “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of your
Mom” article, also included an article in which Awlaki explicitly calls
for the “assassination” of the artist who started “Everybody Draw
Muhammad Day.”270 When the website to which he had linked
subsequently removed Inspire, Morton, “in his capacity as
administrator of the website,” allowed someone in the comment
section to post active links to the magazine—thereby relinking to
Awlaki’s comments.271
CONCLUSION
Recent terrorist plots provide clear reminders that al-Qaeda, its
affiliates, and others fueled by its ideology continue to pose a danger
to the United States, its interests, and its cities.272 For example, in
early August 2013, the United States closed twenty-two embassies
throughout the Middle East and North Africa due to a credible threat
to U.S. interests emanating from AQAP.
Moreover, Ayman
Zawihiri, Osama bin Ladin’s successor as the “emir” of al-Qaeda,
purportedly directed the threat.273 Meanwhile, the April 15, 2013
267. Id. ¶¶ 36–39.
268. Id. ¶¶ 45–54.
269. Id. ¶ 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
270. Id. ¶ 52.
271. Id. ¶ 54.
272. See Barack Obama, President of the Untied States, Remarks at Camp
Pendleton (Aug. 7, 2013), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/07/remarkspresident-camp-pendleton-ca (“[E]ven as we decimated the al-Qaeda leadership that
attacked us on 9/11, al-Qaeda affiliates and like-minded extremists still threaten our
homeland, still threaten our diplomatic facilities, still threaten our businesses
abroad.”).
273. See Tom Cohen, Response to Terror Threat Scrutinized: Did U.S. Go Too
Far?, CNN (Aug. 8, 2013, 6:51pm), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/08/politics/terrorthreat (“A recently intercepted message from al-Zawahiri to al-Wuhayshi telling
AQAP to ‘do something’ set off the embassy closings . . . .”).
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Boston Marathon bombing was a deadly example274 that the threat to
U.S. cities from homegrown extremists persists as well, often fueled
by the availability of information and Jihadist propaganda on the
Internet.275
Although counterterrorism is often thought of as the responsibility
of the federal government, it is clear that local law enforcement can—
and already does—play an important role. This is especially true in
countering the threat of homegrown extremism, where local law
enforcement agencies may in fact have certain advantages over their
federal counterparts. The arrest and prosecution of Jesse Morton
encapsulates local law enforcement’s various roles and potential
advantages in each stage of the process of detecting, disrupting, and
detaining homegrown extremists discussed in this Article. Morton’s
and Revolution Muslim’s activities were first detected and
investigated by the NYPD Intelligence Division.276 The Morton
investigation, which used many of the techniques available to the
NYPD under the revised Handschu Guidelines, led to the NYPD and
FBI cooperating in the investigation and, ultimately, in Morton’s
arrest by the federal authorities and the dismantling of the
Revolution Muslim website (and much of its organization).277 Clearly
demonstrating Morton and Revolution Muslim’s ability to use the
Internet to influence others, Morton’s plea agreement lists nine
homegrown radicals with ties to the Revolution Muslim website.278
Moreover, at least four of the nine individuals listed as radicalized by
or associated in some way with Revolution Muslim were subjects of
NYPD investigations that led to their arrests either at the local or
federal level.279 Finally, Morton was charged under a relatively new
trend of using certain long-standing criminal statutes to effectively

274. See Boston Marathon Terror Attack Fast Facts, supra note 7 (noting that the
Apr. 15, 2013 bombings killed three people and injured at least 264).
275. See Press Release, supra note 210 (“Jesse Morton operated Revolution
Muslim to radicalize those who saw and heard his materials online and to incite them
to engage in violence against those they believed to be enemies of Islam. We may
never know all of those who were inspired to engage in terrorism because of
Revolution Muslim, but the string of recent terrorism cases with ties to Morton’s
organization demonstrates the threat it posed to our national security.”).
276. Id. (referring to the role of the NYPD Intelligence Division in monitoring
Morton’s activities).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. (specifically, Abdel Hameed Shehadeh, Jose Pimental, Mohamed Hamoud
Alessa, and Carlos Eduardo Almonte).
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combat the increasing role that the Internet plays in recruiting and
radicalizing homegrown terrorists.280
As Federal and local officials continue to craft counterterrorism
policy into the second decade after the September 11 terror attacks,
they should bear in mind the roles and advantages that local law
enforcement can bring to the counterterrorism fight.

280. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.

